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ACCOUNTING FOR CATCH IN 
INTERNATIONALLY MANAGED FISHERIES: 
WHAT ROLE FOR STATE RESPONSIBILITY? 
Andrew Serdy∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the impressive strides made in international fisheries law in 
the sixteen years since the convening of the United Nations Conference 
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,1 the state of 
most of the world’s fish stocks with which the conference was concerned 
continues to show little improvement.  This is not because of any 
deficiency in the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement adopted at the 
Conference,2 which as of July 1, 2008 has seventy-one parties, including 
the United States, the European Community and its twenty-seven 
member States, Japan, Canada, Russia, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa, in other words most of the major players in 
international fisheries.  The only calls for its revision at the 2006 Review 
                                                          
∗ Lecturer in Law, Institute of Maritime Law, School of Law, University of 
Southampton. 
 1. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development called for a 
further conference to be convened to pursue the effective implementation of the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] concerning straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks.  United Conference on Env’t & Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Report of the United 
Conference on Environment and Development, ¶ 17.49(e) of Agenda 21 (as Annex II to 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I)).  The United Nations General Assembly 
formally convened the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks and gave it such a mandate.  G.A. Res. 47/192, ¶¶ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/192 
(Dec. 22, 1992). 
 2. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of  10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 
1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm [hereinafter U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement]. 
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Conference were from non-parties, and these were unconvincing.3  The 
standard explanation for the persistent gap between promise and 
performance has tended to be the slowness of regional fisheries 
management organizations to implement the Agreement’s solutions, 
despite the central role they are given by Articles 8 and 13.4  While there 
is some truth to this, in part because not all members of these 
commissions are parties to the Agreement, this Article argues that a 
significant part of the explanation is the conspicuous neglect of an 
essential legal tool in international fisheries discourse: the doctrine of 
State responsibility.  This branch of international law can hold delinquent 
States accountable to other States for their acts and omissions contrary to 
their legal obligations.  One of the reasons why so many stocks have 
been overfished to the point of sharply reduced productivity, or even 
collapse, is that States exerting a risky level of fishing pressure on the 
                                                          
 3. To date there has been virtually no academic analysis of the outcome of the 
conference, but there is one notable exception.  Yoshinobu Takei, U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement: 2006 Review Conference 21 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 551 (2006).  
However, a negative attitude toward the calls for revision is displayed in a study prepared 
for the Fisheries Committee of the European Parliament.  EUR. PARL., Comm. On 
Fisheries, Perspectives for the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 24-25 (2007), 
available at www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file= 
17768.  One of the critics, the Republic of Korea, id at 21, has since become a party.  
Status List for the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ 
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treaty9.asp (last visited June 12, 2008). 
 4. Article 8 provides that where a fisheries commission is competent to establish 
conservation and management measures for particular straddling or highly migratory fish 
stocks, “States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall 
give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of [it], or by agreeing to 
apply the conservation and management measures established by [it].”  U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8(3).  States having a “real interest in the fisheries 
concerned” may become members of the commission, whose terms of participation “shall 
not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a 
manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having a real interest in 
the fisheries concerned.”  Id.  The same Article goes on to provide that only those States 
that are members of a fishery commission, or which agree to apply the conservation and 
management measures it establishes, shall have access to the fishery resources to which 
those measures apply.  Id. art. 8(4).  Where no fisheries commission or arrangement to 
establish conservation and management measures for a particular straddling or highly 
migratory fish stock exists, relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas for 
such stock “shall cooperate to establish [one] or enter into other appropriate arrangements 
to ensure conservation and management of such stock and shall participate in [its] work . 
. . .”  Id. art. 8(5).  Article 13 requires States to cooperate to strengthen existing fisheries 
commissions “in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing 
conservation and management measures for straddling . . . and highly migratory fish 
stocks.”  Id. art. 13. 
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stocks have not been systematically visited with any adverse legal 
consequences before the point of collapse is reached, or for that matter, 
after.  The only consequence they have had to face has been the collapse 
of the stock itself—a consequence that affects all other States with an 
interest in the stock, whether they have contributed to causing the 
collapse or not.  In economic terms, States have been largely able to 
externalize the costs of their risk-taking, leading to levels of risk in the 
form of fishing pressure that are insufficiently precautionary not just 
from a biological viewpoint, but also from an economic one. 
Although there is no shortage of international fisheries documents in 
which the expression “State responsibility” occurs, it is invariably 
preceded either by “flag” or, rarely, “coastal” or “port,” and often in the 
plural, indicating that something other than State responsibility in the 
sense of public international law was in the drafters’ minds.5  In the sense 
in which it is used in these instruments, “responsibility” could easily be 
replaced by “duty,” “obligation,” or a similar term without a noticeable 
change in meaning.  That is, the obligations here, to the extent that they 
exist, are primary and substantive, not the secondary duties associated 
with State responsibility that arise when a primary obligation is 
breached. 
It is similarly easy to find rhetorical references in fisheries 
commissions documents and elsewhere to “responsible fishing States,” 
and when used in this adjectival form the meaning is even less clear.  
The origin of this phrase appears to lie in the Cancún Declaration of 
1992,6 where “responsible” seems to be no more than a term of general 
approbation devoid of any specific meaning.  Subsequently, this use has 
been perpetuated by the soft-law Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.7  
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island 
States and the Government of the United States of America art. 4, Apr. 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 
1048; Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, art. III, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221 
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter FAO Compliance Agreement]; European Economic and Social 
Committee, International Fisheries Governance: Flag State Responsibilities as a Key 
Element (Jan. 25, 2007), http://eesc.europa.eu/activities/press/cp/docs/2007/ 
communique-presse-eesc-006-2007-EN.doc (showing the use of “flag” as a word 
preceding the expression “State responsibility”). 
 6. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), 
Declaration of the International Conference on Responsible Fishing (1992), 
http://legal.icsf.net/icsflegal/uploads/pdf/instruments/res0201.pdf.   
 7. FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FAO Doc. 95/20/REV/1; U.N. 
Sales No. E98.V.11 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ 
005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm. 
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More disturbingly, there are now signs that other State responsibility 
terms have been appropriated for use in a sense quite foreign to that in 
which they appear in the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility.8 For example, an International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) 
recommendation otherwise drafted in orthodox legal language, used 
“counter-measures” where it bears no evident relationship to that concept 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of a State’s acts as set out in 
Article 22.9  Countermeasures in its true meaning was raised not many 
years ago by Rosemary Rayfuse,10 as a way for the high seas boarding 
and inspection provisions in Part VI of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (a 
significant departure from the long-established ordinary rule codified in 
Article 92, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) that on the high seas the flag State of a vessel has 
exclusive jurisdiction over it) to be made opposable to non-parties to that 
treaty.11  Rayfuse argues that where a State persistently breaches its 
customary and, where applicable, conventional, duty to cooperate with 
other States and the institutions established by them in conserving high 
seas fish stocks, other States specially affected may board and inspect 
                                                          
 8. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001),  reprinted in [2001]  2 Y. B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 26-30 [hereinafter ILC 
Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2].  
 9. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
Report for Biennial Period, 2006-07 Part I (2006), at 163 (fifth preambular paragraph), 
available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_06-07_I_1.pdf 
[hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2007/1].  Taken literally, ICCAT would be admitting 
that the measures adopted in this instrument would otherwise be contrary to international 
law.  Not only is this not so, but, since a prior breach of obligation by the targeted State is 
necessary to justify countermeasures, they would presumably be ineffective by definition 
against unregulated (as opposed to illegal) fishing, even though the former is the intended 
target.  This, incidentally, is symptomatic of the quite separate confusion engendered by 
the careless use of the phrase “IUU fishing,” where the three distinct but related 
phenomena are lumped together as one, and unregulated fishing is treated as though it 
were illegal; a kind of conceptual guilt by association.  A leading fisheries economist 
cited elsewhere herein has argued that salvation for high seas fisheries does indeed lie 
only in assimilating unregulated fishing to illegal fishing, but that is an issue warranting 
its own extended analysis in a future paper.  See G.R. Munro, “The Management of 
Shared Fish Stocks,” in Papers Presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the 
Management of Shared Fish Stocks - Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002 (Rome: FAO, 
2003; FAO Fisheries Report 695 (Supplement)), 2 at 19ff.  
 10. Rosemary Rayfuse, Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement, 
NETH. I’NTL L. REV. 41, 53-63 (2004). 
 11. Id. at 57-59. 
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that State’s fishing vessels on the high seas.12  This would be by way of a 
proportionate response, satisfying the criteria for “resort to 
countermeasures” laid down in Article 22 of the ILC’s Draft Articles as a 
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the otherwise unlawful 
interference with the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction.  Provided the 
other necessary elements were present, such an argument might well 
have succeeded as a defense for Canada to the merits of the action 
brought against it by Spain over its actions on the high seas against the 
Spanish-flagged Estai in 1995, which was dismissed by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1998 for want of jurisdiction.13  On the other 
hand, since countermeasures by their very nature tend to be ad hoc 
responses to immediate exigencies, States are unlikely to adopt this 
approach as a preannounced policy, as they would then be admitting in 
effect their willingness to breach international obligations. 
The remainder of this Article is divided as follows: Section II 
considers in the abstract how certain basic State responsibility concepts 
could apply to internationally managed fisheries, and highlights some of 
the practical difficulties that may also have contributed to their neglect; 
Section III—the bulk of the Article—is a case study of how States’ 
practice in accounting to each other for their catches of southern bluefin 
tuna (SBT) has gradually evolved a “compliance” focus over the years 
that owes little to any systematic State responsibility framework; Section 
IV shows that this focus does not sufficiently discharge the member 
States’ responsibility to other States potentially able to enter the fishery 
in pursuance of their UNCLOS Article 116 right to fish on the high seas; 
and Section V offers some concluding thoughts as to how compliance 
can be reunited with State responsibility to benefit international fisheries.  
II. “REAL” STATE RESPONSIBILITY APPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL 
FISHERIES 
Were States willing to embrace it, State responsibility could be 
pressed into service to improve the management of international fisheries 
on several levels.  At one level, there is the question of the attributability 
to States of fishing carried out by vessels of their nationality.  In general, 
States are not responsible for the activities of persons or vessels having 
their nationality.  On the other hand, the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement 
and the FAO Compliance Agreement both now provide, in very similar 
terms, that parties to them must not authorize their vessels to fish for 
                                                          
 12. Id. 
 13. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4). 
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straddling and highly migratory stocks on the high seas, unless they can 
effectively exercise their responsibilities in relation to these vessels.14  
The State party must ensure that its vessels comply with the conservation 
and management measures adopted by any fisheries commission of 
which it is a member, and refrain from fishing for any stock managed by 
a commission of which it is not.15  The requirement of a positive act of 
licensing or authorization ensures at least some level of consciousness by 
the flag State of the level of fishing pressure it exerts on the high seas.  It 
also engenders awareness that other States expect it to control the fishing 
activities on the high seas by the vessels it flags, and that it is 
internationally answerable to them on a political level—if not yet 
obviously responsible on a legal one—if it fails to do so. 
Could the provisions just cited be used as the basis of an argument 
that high seas fishing either already is, or ought to be, an exception to the 
general rule of non-attribution?  Alternatively, such an exception would 
not be necessary if the State’s responsibility were already engaged on the 
basis of its failure to prevent an outcome for which it was not directly 
responsible.  This occurred recently in the context of genocide, where the 
ICJ held that Serbia was not responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica, 
but had failed to comply with a treaty obligation to prevent it.16  This 
would not be an efficacious solution to fisheries problems, however, if 
the only remedy in such circumstances is a declaration by way of 
satisfaction, which is all that Bosnia and Herzegovina secured in this 
case.17 
Despite the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
providing in identical terms that States have “the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction,”18 a survey by Alan Boyle reveals very few instances of 
                                                          
 14. U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18(2); FAO Compliance 
Agreement, supra note 4, art. III(3). 
 15. U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 17(2), 18(1); FAO Compliance 
Agreement, supra note 4, art. III(1)(a) and (2). 
 16. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 
¶¶ 377-450 (Feb. 26). 
 17. Id. ¶¶ 451-470.   
 18. The Stockholm Declaration is reprinted in United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration on the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972).  
The Rio Declaration forms Annex I to the Report of the U.N. Conference on 
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compensation being sought and granted for any sort of environmental 
harm.19  The single instance touching on fisheries—compensation by the 
United States to Japan in the 1950s, without admission of liability, for 
injury to fishermen on the high seas and contamination of fish by U.S. 
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons—did not distinguish between the 
physical and economic elements of the damage suffered.20  From this, 
Boyle concludes that: 
[T]here is sufficient uncertainty regarding the subject, and its 
utility in preference to alternative approaches, to pose serious 
doubts about the concept [of State responsibility] . . . .  The most 
important objection to a strategy which relies on state 
responsibility, in the form of an obligation for states to 
compensate for harm, remains the argument that it is an 
inadequate model for the enforcement of international standards 
of environmental protection.  Like tort law it can complement, 
but does not displace, the primary need for the setting and 
enforcement of adequate international standards of 
environmental protection.21  
Instead, Boyle advocates the use of private civil liability remedies 
against those directly responsible for environmental costs, as well as the 
application of the “polluter pays” principle coupled with criminal law 
sanctions through prosecutions by the flag State.22  This, however, would 
require relevant States to be under an obligation to allow such litigation 
by injured parties in their domestic courts, but there is no sign of such a 
development, at least in international fisheries law.  Private civil liability 
is also far better suited to compensating for single catastrophic pollution 
events than for the cumulative harm of excessive fishing pressure on a 
                                                                                                                                  
Environment and Development.  United Nations Conference on Env’t & Dev., supra note 
1.  Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration instructs States to “develop further international 
law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage 
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction;” 
language very similar to Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration of two decades 
earlier.  Id. 
 19. Alan E. Boyle, Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources: 
Compensation and Other Approaches, in HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO 
COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 83, 87-88 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 
1997). 
 20. Kathy Leigh, Liability for Damage to the Global Commons, 14 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 129, 136 (1992). 
 21. Boyle, supra note 19, at 91. 
 22. Id. at 92, 98. 
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stock that has been exerted by multiple operators.  Thus, Kathy Leigh 
argues that the distinction between State and civil liability can be 
overstated, and that “[c]ivil liability regimes are obligations entered into 
by States with respect to persons under their jurisdiction.  Civil liability 
can thus be one way of satisfying State liability.”23   
Dinah Shelton, by contrast, is more positively disposed to invocation 
of State responsibility for breaches of international environmental 
obligations.  While acknowledging a decline in the frequency of such 
recourse, she attributes it to the rise of non-adversarial compliance 
procedures, which is especially marked in the environmental sphere in 
areas outside the jurisdiction of any State; such as the high seas where 
breaches of obligations are “unlikely to injure another state directly or 
give rise to a classic claim for reparations.”24  One possible reason for 
this is that on the rare occasions when State responsibility is invoked, the 
State doing so typically envisages the process primarily as a compliance 
mechanism aimed at securing cessation of the non-compliance, with 
remedy for past injury being less important than future compliance.   
While this is understandable from the point of view of maintaining 
cooperative relations among States, it does nothing to advance the 
attainment of the goal of whichever treaty regime happens to be in 
question. Without remedial action the fish stock will remain smaller, or 
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere higher, than 
ultimately desired.25  With a view to actually achieving the management 
goals that international fisheries commissions adopt, what is envisaged 
below for State responsibility concerning fisheries is precisely the 
complementary role to international regulation that Boyle admits.  Since 
the insufficiency of such regulation on its own is amply demonstrated 
throughout this work, his misgivings do not appear sufficient to deter 
recourse to it. 
Secondly, although State responsibility is conceived as confined to 
the context of a breach of international law,26 this need not be a serious 
obstacle to its applicability in an international fisheries context.  In the 
abstract, it should not be excessively difficult for a State contemplating 
invoking another State’s international responsibility to establish a breach 
either of the obligations cited above, or of the more general obligation to 
                                                          
 23. Leigh, supra note 20, at 140. 
 24. Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 834 (2002). 
 25. Id. at 836, 854-55. 
 26. The full title of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility indicates this.  ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117.  
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cooperate on high seas fisheries in Articles 117-119 of UNCLOS, a duty 
now thought to bind all States, even non-parties, as customary 
international law.27  There is, however, one potential complication, 
namely, determining which States are injured by overfishing.  This may 
well depend on what specific obligations are owed.  Article 42 of the 
ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles provides that:  
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility 
of another State if the obligation breached is owed to:  
  (a) That State individually; or 
  (b) A group of States including that State, or the 
international community as a whole, and the breach of the 
obligation: 
  (i) Specially affects that State; or  
  (ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position 
of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with 
respect to the further performance of the obligation.28 
Only seldom will paragraph (a) be applicable, since the obligation of 
the overfishing State to limit its catch from a given stock to some 
specific figure, or to cooperate with the State seeking redress, is not 
likely to be owed to the latter State individually unless these two States 
are the only ones fishing that stock.  It is thus necessary for a subset of 
all States to be designated as “specially affected” as required by 
subparagraph (b)(i), and for this to occur, some criterion will be 
essential.  This is because it is not evident that breach of a fishing catch 
limit would, except in rare cases, be “of such a character as radically to 
change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed 
with respect to the further performance of the obligation.”29  As 
explained in the ILC’s Commentary on Article 42,30 by reference to the 
similar commentary accompanying its 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of 
                                                          
 27. STUART B. KAYE, INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 322-23 (2001).  Kaye 
comes to this conclusion based on the utterances made by the States in the Bering Sea 
pollock fishery.  Id. 
 28. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117. 
 29. Id. 
 30. “The other States must be . . . at least individually affected in that the breach 
necessarily undermines or destroys the basis for its further performance of the treaty.”  
ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 117 (emphasis added).  Overfishing rarely 
destroys the basis, but by definition will always undermine it in greater or lesser degree.   
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Treaties31 that eventually became the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,32 the provision was drafted with black-and-white situations like 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty33 in mind.  In these, there can only be 
compliance or non-compliance, but no tertium quid.  This is not, 
however, the position where the obligation is one of adhering to a 
quantified limit, as is typically the case in fisheries, but also in many 
conventional arms limitation treaties where it may be possible to speak 
of a continuum of compliance (e.g., where a State is limited to a certain 
number of tanks, aircraft, etc., in a given area), such that if a party 
marginally exceeds these numerical or spatial limits it would most 
probably shift the balance of advantage for other parties in the direction 
of non-compliance.  This would raise the possibility that they will in turn 
act non-compliantly, but by no means render it inevitable. For example, 
if the non-compliance is trivial, other parties could well calculate that the 
balance of political advantage lies in making public protests, rather than 
taking concrete action.34   
It is argued here that a profitability criterion should be applied to 
identify specially affected States.  That is, overfishing on the high seas in 
violation of the obligations discussed above injures the economic interest 
of every State that could profitably fish the stock at the biomass that 
produces the maximum sustainable yield (Bmsy), or, where applicable, at 
a target point established in accordance with Annex II to the U.N. Fish 
Stocks Agreement.  In other words, any such State ought to be a 
specially affected injured State for the purposes of Article 42.   
His general scepticism notwithstanding, Boyle concedes that a State 
whose fishing rights on the high seas are denied, or interfered with by 
pollution, could be an “injured State” for the purposes of the ILC Draft 
Articles, so that there is no need to rely on dubious arguments in favor of 
                                                          
 31. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted in [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II/2 
172, 187.  
 32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 33. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 34. According to Edith Brown Weiss, States make statements disapproving of 
breaches “to secure the integrity of the rule and prevent its dissolution through 
unchallenged practice.”  Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-
First Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 803 (2002).  In a similar vein Shelton argues that 
even where a breach of a multilateral obligation causes no harm to any State, “it may 
undermine the effectiveness of the legal regime and respect for the rule of law.”  Shelton, 
supra note 23, at 839. 
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an actio popularis to give standing to any State prepared to take action.35  
Leigh agrees: “Environmental damage can also cause pure economic loss 
to a State or its nationals, as in the case of decreased fish takes due to 
contamination or reduction of fish stocks.”36   
Closer examination of the ILC’s Commentary on its Draft Articles, 
however, casts doubt on whether this conclusion, desirable though it may 
be, can always be supported.  It states that the term “group of States” in 
subparagraph (b)(i) is intended to refer to States “which have combined 
to achieve some collective purpose and which may be considered for that 
purpose as making up a community of States of a functional character.”37  
This would cover members of a fishery commission and, probably, those 
formally cooperating with it under Article 8(3) of the U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement,38 but not non-member States having in common only their 
actual or potential economic interests in a high seas fishery.  The ILC 
Commentary illustrates this with the example of a breach on the high 
seas of the UNCLOS Article 192 obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, which specially affects the beaches or coastal 
fisheries of a coastal State—i.e. not the use of the high seas by other 
States.  Later it is explained that “[f]or a State to be considered injured, it 
must be affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it from the 
generality of other States to which the obligation is owed.”39   
As for subparagraph (b)(ii), the ILC seems to be wary of opening the 
floodgates.  It notes that, “it may not be the case that just any breach of 
the obligation has the effect of undermining the performance of all the 
other States involved, and it is desirable that this subparagraph be narrow 
in its scope.”40  For this reason, a State is not injured by such breach 
unless it “is of such a character as radically to affect the enjoyment of the 
rights or the performance of the obligations of all the other States to 
which the obligation is owed.”41   
                                                          
 35. Boyle, supra note 19, at 93. 
 36. Leigh, supra note 20, at 143 (emphasis added).  Since the loss thus formulated is 
that of States already involved in the fishery, Leigh cautions that this leaves 
uncompensated the loss of potential future use of the resource by other States.  Id. at 144.  
Such uncompensated loss would, however, be likely to be small if the profitability 
criterion suggested in the previous paragraph is adopted—diminishing the extent of this 
problem. 
 37. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 118-19. 
 38. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 39. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 119. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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It may be thought that this is setting the bar too high. The ILC 
Commentary notes that all States have the right to react individually to a 
breach of this kind even though “they may all be equally affected and 
none may have suffered quantifiable damage for the purposes of article 
36 [concerning compensation].”42  What about the situation, however, 
when, as argued here, a group of States to which no obligation to limit 
catch from a stock to a given amount runs can, albeit with some technical 
difficulty, nonetheless be identified as having suffered quantifiable 
damage?  Article 42 seems to have left a lacuna into which high seas 
fisheries have fallen: the States concerned are indeed thus affected in a 
way distinguishing them from the generality of other States that could 
not fish the stock profitably at Bmsy, but this, it seems, is not enough to 
bring them back under subparagraph (b)(i) because they are outside the 
fishery commission regime, while the mere fact that other States are 
entitled to react to the breach renders subparagraph (b)(ii) inapplicable.  
Of course, it is desirable that States join or formally cooperate with 
international fishery commissions competent for the stocks in which they 
are interested.  If they do not, the invidious position of being left without 
the ability to invoke the responsibility of an overfishing State in which 
this leaves them is a good incentive to do just that.  Since what counts is 
whether the affected State was a member or cooperating non-member at 
the time when the damage was done, joining subsequently would be of 
no use.   
That said, the alternative left to States that find themselves without 
effective remedy under Article 42, because they are not “specially 
affected” by the breach of the obligation owed to them by the overfishing 
State, is broadly satisfactory.  The remedy is to rely on Article 48, which, 
complementarily to Article 42, provides that: 
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another State . . . if:  
  (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States 
including that State, and is established for the collective 
interest of the group; or  
  (b)  The obligation breached is owed to the international 
community as a whole.   
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 
may claim from the responsible States:  
  [. . .] 
                                                          
 42. Id. 
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  (b) performance of the obligation of reparation…in the 
interest of the    injured State or of the beneficiaries of 
the obligation breached.43 
Here, paragraph 1(a) seems to cater to those States that are members 
(or cooperating non-members) of the fisheries commission, but are not 
specially affected because they could not fish the stock profitably at Bmsy.  
Of greater interest, however, is that paragraph 1(b) covers precisely the 
opposite situation, namely that under discussion of a State unable to take 
advantage of Article 42 because it has not joined the commission, but 
wishing to preserve the possibility of entering the fishery at some future 
point in exercise of its UNCLOS Article 116 right and therefore with an 
interest in seeing the stock conserved.  In this sense it is indeed a 
“beneficiary” of the customary and conventional obligation to restore a 
depleted stock to Bmsy (subject to the economic and environmental 
factors mentioned in UNCLOS Article 119, paragraph 1(a)).44  Such a 
State will, under paragraph 2 of Article 48, be able to seek that 
restoration. 
If such reparations are available, it should not be necessary to resort 
to the second conceivable alternative, a speculative argument not relying 
on a breach at all that might be mounted.  Under Article 116 of 
UNCLOS every State has the right for its nationals to fish on the high 
seas, subject to its treaty obligations and other relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS.45  Logically, accountability for the consequences of fishing on 
the high seas must fall under either State responsibility or the ILC’s 
incomplete work on the topic of International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law.46  
The injurious consequences in question would be economic harm caused 
by vessels flagged to State A to a fishery based in State B.  The latter 
topic was subsequently subdivided in a way that made it clear that it was 
centred on transboundary harm from inherently hazardous activities,47 
but it may conceivably yield formulations of principles that do away with 
                                                          
 43. ILC Yearbook 2001 Vol. II/2, supra note 8, at 126. 
 44. UNCLOS, supra note 1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth 
session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 153 [hereinafter ILC 1994]; 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session, 
U.N. Doc. A/50/10, [1995] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 84, 86 (specifically mentioning 
damage to fish stocks in paragraph 377 as an instance of harm to the environment).  
 47. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-ninth session 
[1997] 2 Y.B. Int’l L Comm’n. 59, ¶ 168(a), U.N. Doc. A/52/10. 
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the need to establish a breach of some obligation in order to hold States 
accountable for their acts and omissions on the high seas.48  The 
disadvantage is that it would be undesirable for fishing to be split among 
both branches of the international law of compensation, with one set of 
compensatory rules coming by way of State responsibility for breach of 
an actual catch limit, and another less stringent set coming from liability 
for injurious consequences for overfishing in the absence of a quantified 
limit.  Such a split may act as a disincentive to the adoption of such 
limits.  That minor caveat aside, it may be concluded that one way or 
another, legal tools are already available to interested States to avoid a 
failure of accountability posing further risk to the stocks that they wish to 
see conserved.   
                                                          
 48. This may depend on whether the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas still 
extends to the use of areas not under the jurisdiction of any State, notably the high seas. 
Recently the principle has been argued to prohibit high seas fishing of straddling stocks 
to the extent that this damages the coastal State.  B. Applebaum, The Straddling Stocks 
Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for Coastal 
State Action, in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 282, 301 (Alfred Soons ed., 1990).  Although the focus on 
territory as the “tuum” and “alienum” in the leading Trail Smelter arbitration (involving 
pollution of land in the United States by fumes from a smelter located on Canadian 
territory), Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), has tended to 
obscure its wider applicability, in its origins the doctrine was seen as pertaining to rights 
rather than land, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court in relation to high seas 
navigation, see Marianna Flora Case 24 U.S. 1, 42 (1825).  The same reasoning could 
equally be said to apply to damage to other States fishing on the high seas by virtue of 
their UNCLOS Article 116 right.  The high seas is expressly contemplated by the ILC as 
the place where transboundary harm may be caused, ILC 1994, supra note 45, at 163, but 
its work on this topic was intended to exclude “those activities which harm the so-called 
global commons per se but without any harm to any other State,” id. at 164.  This is 
consonant with Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, by which “States 
have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”  Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 
79.  Boyle regards the conceptual distinction between this topic and State responsibility 
as unsound: he believes that most of it could easily be subsumed into the latter, the small 
remainder being an almost incidental codification by the ILC of the modest substantive 
obligations of general international environmental law.  Alan E. Boyle, State 
Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 21-
22 (1990).  It is submitted that State responsibility is the preferable approach for 
international fisheries law for the same reason, the only difference being that the 
substantive obligation already has a well settled label—the duty to cooperate—but its 
precise content is unclear. 
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Thirdly, and arguably the most in need of development in its 
application to international fisheries, is the rule on the secondary 
obligation of reparation that arises as a result of the breach of a primary 
rule.  In the Chorźow Factory case, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice laid down the standard that: 
[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.  Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution 
in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it – such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act 
contrary to international law.49 
Possibly it is the extreme practical difficulty in carrying out these 
prescriptions that has deterred States from applying them to breaches of 
fishery catch limits, even in the case where it was squarely alleged that a 
State had taken a known amount of fish in excess of what was asserted 
(but denied by the respondent State) to be a binding limit.  In the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute, Australia and New Zealand claimed that 
the 3662 tonnes of that tuna reported by Japan as caught under its 
experimental fishing campaigns of 1998 and 1999, in addition to its 
ordinary commercial catch, were in excess of the last national allocation 
set for Japan by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) for 1997, which they said remained binding in 
the absence of any agreement for subsequent years.  The relief they 
sought was an order for Japan to “restrict its catch in any given fishing 
year to its national allocation as last agreed in the Commission, subject to 
the reduction of such catch for the current year by the amount of SBT 
taken by Japan in the course of its unilateral experimental fishing in 
1998 and 1999.”50 
                                                          
 49. Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.17, at 47 (Sept. 
13). 
 50. Statements of Claim under Article 1 of Annex VII to UNCLOS by which 
Australia and New Zealand commenced their litigation against Japan, 29 ¶ 69(2)(d), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ISCID/Inde.jsp (select “News Releases” from the 
“Publications” menu option; then follow “May 07, 2000” hyperlink; then follow 
“Statement of Claim of Australia and New Zealand” hyperlink) (emphasis added). 
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In other words, rather than attempt to quantify the damage allegedly 
done by Japan to the stock, the applicant States simply sought future 
catch reductions equal to Japan’s 3662 tonnes of experimental catch. 
By contrast, wiping out the consequences of a breach of a catch limit 
would seem to entail a complex set of problematic and contestable 
biological and economic calculations in order to account to other States 
for their losses suffered through reduced availability of overfished 
stocks.  Restitution in kind, which is the primary remedy whose 
feasibility must first be investigated, involves establishing both (a) what 
the state of the stock would have been but for the breach, and (b) what 
future catch reduction is needed to restore it to that state.  With the 
possible exception of minor overcatches, this cannot simply be a matter 
of deducting a tonnage from future catches one or two years hence equal 
to the overcatch, with an additional penalty formula applied in defined 
circumstances, as has been the pattern to date.   
On the one hand, a stock whose biomass is above Bmsy may not be 
damaged by the overcatch at all, to the contrary, it may even enhance the 
productivity of the fishery for others, while a stock whose biomass is 
short of Bmsy but increasing will suffer more or less damage than the 
additional catch taken, depending on how high the total allowable catch 
(TAC) is.  Thus, if restitution in kind would not restore the balance of 
benefits among States, some manner of an account of profits would be 
needed, though this may not be easily accommodated under the rubric of 
“damages for loss sustained.”   
On the other hand, a stock in a perilous state can be pushed over the 
brink to commercial extinction by a significant overcatch.  This is 
possibly what happened to the South Tasman Rise orange roughy stock 
in 1999 when, on the assumption that the fishery would continue, New 
Zealand committed itself to “repay” 640 tonnes to the stock over the 
years 2000-2006.  This was a result of the large, unregulated catch by its 
fleet in 1999 after it had agreed with Australia on catch limits for that 
year, but before that agreement could be reduced to writing and New 
Zealand’s limit could be enacted into domestic law.  Yet the repayment 
soon ceased to be of any practical significance because the fish 
themselves could no longer be found in commercially catchable 
quantities.51  In this sort of situation, restitution in kind would not be 
                                                          
 51. Erik Jaap Molenaar, The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 2000 and other 
Initiatives on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy, 16 INT’L J. OF MARINE 
AND COASTAL L.77, at 81, 84 (2001).  Molenaar’s legal history of this fishery was 
updated to 2003 by the author.  Andrew Serdy, Schrödinger’s TAC – Superposition of 
Alternative Catch Limits from 2003 to 2006 under the South Tasman Rise Orange 
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possible and a monetary figure would need to be placed on the loss 
suffered by other actual and potential participants in the fishery.  This is 
no easy matter, but one where a range of economic data will normally be 
available to guide those charged with making the calculations.  None of 
this, however, is an argument for not trying; the result may be imperfect 
and inexact, and the respondent State will surely be entitled to the benefit 
of any doubt, and to argue, if there had been previous overfishing by 
other States, that the latter had contributed to their own loss and thus it 
should not have to bear the full burden alone.  Even so, the very fact of 
being held to account may well be enough to make States’ attitude 
towards the fulfilment of their obligations significantly more rigorous.  
III. CASE STUDY: ACCOUNTING FOR CATCH IN THE  
SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA FISHERY 
Although it is possible to adduce numerous examples from other 
more prominent international fisheries commissions such as ICCAT52 
and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)53—both of 
which will be referred to on occasion—the way in which catches have 
been accounted for in the SBT fishery best illuminates the points being 
made here for several reasons.  First, the CCSBT, established by the 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna,54 is one of 
the few single-species commissions and, as such, has a relatively small 
number of members.  Thus, questions of accounting are presented in its 
reports in relatively pure form, uncluttered by considerations relating to 
other fisheries managed by the same commission or collateral advantages 
sought by parties without direct interest in the fishery.  Second, unlike 
                                                                                                                                  
Roughy Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand, in FAO, Deep Sea 2003: 
Conference on the Governance and Management of Deep-sea Fisheries, Dec. 1-5, 2003, 
Conference Reports, 494.  Although this represents little more than half of the notional 
overcatch had the agreed limit been in force, it is more than a year’s worth of quota, a 
proportion unsurpassed in international fisheries practice, though now run close by 
ICCAT’s reduction of Taiwan’s Atlantic bigeye tuna catch limit from to 16,500 tonnes to 
4600 tonnes for 2006 in response to misreporting catch of around 15,000 tonnes (as 
estimated by Japan) from that stock as having been taken in the Indian Ocean where it 
was not subject to quota.  See ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2004-05 Part II (2005), 
Vol. I, 156, 157-59, 239 (2006) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2006/1].  
 52. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 
20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (creating ICCAT). 
 53. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 (creating NAFO). 
 54. Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993; 1819 
U.N.T.S. 359 [hereinafter 1993 Convention]. 
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the position in other commissions, the catch limitations of SBT among its 
members in fact preceded the Commission’s establishment by several 
years, making it possible to discern whether their behavior or practice 
changed at the time when limits whose legal status was previously 
unclear became undoubtedly binding.  Third, the 1998-2001 dispute in 
which Australia and New Zealand challenged Japan on the latter’s 
experimental fishing for SBT brought to light, through the adversarial 
nature of the oral and written pleadings, considerations that are usually 
omitted by the consensus-seeking drafters of commission meeting 
reports.  Lastly, only in the CCSBT has there been (though it was 
suspended before reaching any firm conclusions) anything resembling a 
proper debate on the pros and cons of making national allocations of 
quota tradable among its members.  This has not been replicated in other 
commissions, one of which has even gone so far as to rule out trading 
altogether in principle, while nonetheless approving transactions ad hoc 
in practice.55  Should quota trading eventually come to pass, it will 
introduce further complexity into the State responsibility aspects of 
accounting for catch.  For example, if quota is traded mid-season from 
State A to State B and is exceeded, is State B alone responsible for the 
overcatch, or do A and B share responsibility for it in proportion to their 
catches?  Be that as it may, a trading system could be expected to bring 
significant, if incidental, improvements to international fisheries 
management by forcing commissions to improve their performance in 
accounting for catch of the species for which they are competent.   
In the first phase, from 1982 to 1993, fisheries officials from 
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand met annually to discuss the SBT 
fishery, their meetings preceded by meetings of scientists from the three 
States.  No treaty was directly applicable to the SBT fishery.  The three 
States had all signed UNCLOS but not ratified it.56  The 1958 Geneva 
                                                          
 55. Andrew Serdy, Trading of Fishery Commission Quota under International Law, 
21 OCEAN YEARBOOK 265 (2007) (investigating the legal permissibility of and 
requirements for such a system).  See also CCSBT, Quota Trading under the Convention 
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Attachment A to CCSBT Doc. CCSBT-
EC/0410/16 (on file with author); CCSBT, Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna “Quota Trading”—Legal Advice, CCSBT Doc. CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01 
(on file with author). 
 56. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&ch
apter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).  Australia and New 
Zealand signed on Dec. 10, 1982; Japan followed on Feb. 7, 1983.  Id. 
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Convention on High Seas Fishing57 was inapplicable because Japan, and 
New Zealand were not parties to it.  Although migratory paths took part 
of the SBT stock into the southern Atlantic Ocean, and thus under the 
purview of ICCAT, only Japan was a member of that body.  In any 
event, ICCAT deferred to the three States which could adopt measures 
for the entire range of the stock.  Therefore the only law that bound all 
three of them was customary international law, which by the end of that 
phase had already become identical with Articles 64 and 116-119 of 
UNCLOS, although at what precise time this occurred is neither easy to 
identify nor particularly relevant.  Throughout this period, therefore, the 
legal status of the catch limits set at annual meetings of the three States’ 
fisheries officials was not evident.  The commitments were recorded in 
the reports of these meetings, which were more often than not left in 
draft form and never finalized, let alone made public.58  These records 
could not objectively be considered treaties, and none of the three ever 
took any formal step, such as presenting them to their legislatures along 
with other treaties, suggesting that it subjectively thought otherwise. 
Could overcatch beyond such a limit be a breach of the duty of 
cooperation set out in Articles 64 and 118 of UNCLOS?  Such a 
conclusion would not necessarily follow, and would depend in part on 
whether the obligation represented by a catch limit is better characterized 
as an obligation de conduite or an obligation de résultat.  In these early 
years, the three States appear to have treated it, perhaps surprisingly, as 
the former: as long as the State had some sort of administrative system to 
limit its own catch, occasional failure of that system seems to have 
carried no consequences beyond embarrassment at the annual trilateral 
meeting.  They informed each other of their accounting regimes at these 
meetings only on an ad hoc basis.59 
                                                          
 57. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, April 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. 
 58. Summary documents from the first ten scientific meetings were, however, 
published by Australia. BUREAU OF RURAL RESOURCES, REPORTS OF THE TRILATERAL 
SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSIONS AMONG AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND NEW ZEALAND ON SOUTHERN 
BLUEFIN TUNA 1982-1991 (1992) [hereinafter TRILATERAL SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 
COMPENDIUM].  
 59. For instance, Japan announced at the eighth SBT trilateral management meeting 
that it had instituted penalties of two years in jail or a ¥500,000 fine for violation of catch 
limits. Bureau of Rural Resources, Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management 
Discussions Eighth Meeting, (Sept. 18-21, 1989) Summary Record, at 4 (unpublished 
report, on file with author, extracted from files of the former Australian Government 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy by kind permission of Mr. Geoff Williams 
of the Bureau of Rural Sciences).  Australia advised that stringent measures for 
monitoring the catch and size composition of catches were an integral part of the 
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A second or intermediate phase lasted from May 10, 1993, when the 
treaty establishing the CCSBT was signed, until May 20, 1994, when it 
came into force.  Having signed but not ratified the treaty, the three 
States had an obligation in the terms of Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties60 to refrain from acts contrary to its 
object and purpose.  The third phase began with the entry into force of 
the 1993 Convention in May 1994, and has continued with a brief 
interregnum to the present day.61   
Once set, it has not inevitably been the case that catch limits have 
been adhered to, despite being ostensibly binding.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
given that TAC and national allocations are the central management tool 
with which the 1993 Convention equips the CCSBT, it provides no 
means for the parties each to assure themselves that the others are 
adhering to their negotiated catch limits.  To this day, the CCSBT lacks a 
uniform catch accounting policy, leaving it to each member to adopt its 
own regime, with consequent susceptibility to manipulation to conceal 
overcatch.  In the early years, parties informed each other of their 
                                                                                                                                  
Australian SBT Fishery Management Plan.  Id. at 3.  All SBT landed in Australia were 
weighed and assessed for length, recreational fishing groups had agreed not to land SBT, 
and legislation had been introduced to prohibit any landings of SBT outside the total 
Australian quota.  Id. 
 60. Vienna Convention, supra note 32, art. 18. 
 61. For reasons previously explained, the entry into force of UNCLOS for the last of 
the three States, New Zealand, on August 18, 1996, made no change in the applicable 
law.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  The entry into force of the U.N. Fish 
Stocks Agreement for the last of the three—Japan—on September 6,  2006, however, 
would have marked the start of a fourth phase had not the Republic of Korea, a non-party 
to that Agreement, acceded to the 1993 Convention on October 17, 2001.  See 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Status List 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaty_list/depository/sbtuna.html (last visited July 8, 
2008).  A brief fourth phase did therefore begin when the Agreement entered into force 
for that State on March 2, 2008, but ended on April 8, 2008, when Indonesia, a non-party 
to the Agreement, acceded to the 1993 Convention.  Id.  The new fifth phase is in 
practical terms simply a revival of the third.  The CCSBT in 2001 formed an Extended 
Commission to accommodate Taiwan, which joined it in 2002.  See Andrew Serdy, 
Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a 
Fishing Entity, LXXV BRIT. Y. B. OF INT’L L. 183, 185-199 (2004).  Taiwan is not 
eligible to become party to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, but has not made known any 
opposition to it and has taken advantage of the leeway it offers to associate itself with the 
CCSBT and a number of other commissions.  See e.g. id. at 200-215; Nien-Tsu Alfred 
Hu, Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution, and Practice from Taiwan’s 
Perspective, 37 OCEAN DEV. AND INT’L L. 149, 154-57.   
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accounting regimes at meetings only on an ad hoc basis, continuing the 
practice of the trilateral period.62 
Thus, at the CCSBT’s Third Meeting, Australia explained its 
specialized system of accounting for farmed fish,63 but it was Taiwan as 
an observer that led the way with respect to actual catch.  Since 1996, it 
related, every Taiwanese vessel that caught SBT had been required to 
report the weight and fishing ground to the Fisheries Department of the 
Kaohsiung Municipal Government.64  At the Fourth Meeting, New 
Zealand explained that vessels participating in its SBT fishery compete 
for catch until the annual limit of 420 tonnes is reached.65  The Ministry 
of Fisheries requires licensed fish receivers and larger vessels that freeze 
their catch to submit weekly catch reports for verification.66  
                                                          
 62. See infra subsection A, text between notes 71 and 86. 
 63. See infra subsection D, text between notes 131 and 136. 
 64. CCSBT, Report of the Third Annual Meeting (Revised), Part I, Attachment K, at 
54 (1996), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/ 
report_of_ccsbt3_part1.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT3(1) Report].  This information was 
subsequently updated: since 2002, each vessel fishing for SBT must be equipped with a 
vessel monitoring system that provides the vessel’s location to a monitoring center by 
satellite, and the length of each fish caught must be measured.  In order to obtain the SBT 
statistical document, daily catch, position, and discards records must be supplied in 
weekly reports.  CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Twelfth Annual 
Meeting, 73 (2005), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ 
ccsbt_12/report_of_ccsbt12.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC4 Report]. 
 65. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting, Part I, 53 (1997), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_4/report_of_ccsbt4_part1.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT4(1) Report]. 
 66. Id.  See also, CCSBT, Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting, 91-92 (2001), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_8/report_of_ccsbt8.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT8 Report].  In 2003, weekly reporting was required once 25% of the quota had been 
taken, and daily reporting once 50% was taken, with a view to closure of the season as close as 
possible to the New Zealand national allocation being reached; all SBT permit holders were 
then notified that the season was closed and that it would be an offense to take SBT for the 
remainder of the fishing year.  CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Tenth 
Annual Meeting, 77 (2003), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ 
ccsbt_10/report_of_ccsbt10.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC2 Report].  Since 2004, all operators 
have been required to furnish monthly catch returns which are matched against individual quota 
holdings.  Financial penalties apply on a monthly basis to those who catch SBT without quota; 
operators have the opportunity to reconcile their quota and catch until the end of the fishing year 
(i.e. by purchase of quota, if available), after which the penalties increase.  The total catch is 
assessed annually and adjustment made in future years’ limits to balance the catch from the 
fishery and the New Zealand national allocation.  CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission 
of the Eleventh Annual Meeting, 74 (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_ccsbt11.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC3 Report].  
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At the CCSBT’s Fifth Meeting, Japan explained that the Japan 
Fisheries Agency set an annual catch limit and closed seasons to protect 
spawning and juvenile fish for three separate fishing areas off Tasmania, 
Cape Town, and in the southern Indian Ocean.  It required vessels to 
report their catch and position, dispatched patrol boats, and posted 
observers aboard fishing vessels.  Under government supervision, the 
industry itself decided the allocation of the catch among the areas, as 
well as the numbers of vessels and starting dates of fishing in each.  
Vessels had to report entry to and departure from the fishing ground 
within three days, and report catches at intervals of ten days.  They were 
encouraged, though not obliged, to report catch data including biological 
data such as size composition and oceanographic data daily via satellite.  
On the basis of the information thus supplied, the Government calculated 
the date on which the catch limit for each area would be reached, and by 
regulation prohibited fishing after that date.67 
Not until the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000 did the Parties 
agree to share information on their respective monitoring regimes for 
catch, landings, and non-retention practice by their vessels, their use of 
observer programs, licensing systems, and other relevant elements of 
their compliance regimes.68  It took even longer for the CCSBT to hold a 
meeting of its Compliance Committee.  Despite a proposal by Japan at its 
very first meeting in 1994 and the decision to establish the Committee in 
1999,69 its first meeting did not take place until October 2006.70  What 
                                                          
 67. CCSBT, Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting, Part I, 43-44 (1999), available at 
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_5/report_of_ccsbt5_part1.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT5(1) Report].  Five enforcement vessels spent a total of 453 vessel days on station 
in the 1997 season and 589 vessel days in the 1998 seasons respectively.  Id. ¶ 7(1).  
Observers spent a total of 1,050 days on station spread over fifteen vessels and 704 days 
over ten vessels in those respective seasons.  Id. ¶ 7(2).  In addition, fifteen observers 
spent a total of 829 days aboard the vessels participating in experimental fishing during 
the 1998 season.  See id. 
 68. CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting, Part II, ¶ 25 (2000), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_ccsbt6_Part2.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT6(2) Report].  
 69. At the CCSBT’s First Meeting, Japan proposed the establishment of an infractions 
“sub-committee.”  CCSBT, Report of the First Annual Meeting, 3 (May 1994) 
[hereinafter CCSBT1 Report].  The term “sub-committee” appears to be a misnomer, as 
the Scientific Committee provided for in Article 9 of the 1993 Convention had not yet 
been formed, and the CCSBT did not at this meeting establish any other committee to 
which it would have reported.  Reference is subsequently made to a future “Enforcement 
and Infractions Committee” in the record of the informal meeting of April 1995.  Japan-
Australia-New Zealand Southern Bluefin Tuna Informal Consultations, Draft Summary 
Record, at 9 (1995).  No concrete steps were taken for three years until Australia and 
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follows is an enumeration of the issues that could conceivably have come 
to the Committee’s attention had it existed earlier. As will be apparent, 
some issues were in fact considered by the CCSBT in plenary. 
A. Commercial Overcatch 
No Party to the 1993 Convention has had an unblemished record of 
limiting its catches to its national allocation.  Though views have varied 
as to what legal consequences, if any, flow from it, all Parties accept that 
overcatch is a breach of an international obligation made binding by 
Article 8, paragraph 7 of that Convention.  Accordingly, as detailed 
below, a practice has developed of compensating for it by catch 
reductions in future years, albeit without varying the TAC and national 
allocations, or the voluntary limit in the years from 1998 to 2003 when 
no such measures were agreed.71 
One of the first issues tackled in the trilateral period, or first phase, 
was whether the catch limits covered only targeted catch of SBT, or also 
fish of the same species taken as bycatch.  Although it is evident that 
only the latter is a genuine discipline on the catch, since quite large 
amounts of a species may be removed from the sea inadvertently, 
Australia’s system of individual transferable quotas72 did not initially 
                                                                                                                                  
New Zealand made the point that the need for the members to act quickly to establish 
such a committee was underscored by the December 1996 incident when an Australian 
aerial surveillance operation, conducted to investigate Japan’s claims that non-member 
vessels were moving into high seas SBT fishing grounds as soon as fishing by Japanese 
vessels had ceased, instead revealed at least forty Japanese vessels operating after closure 
of the Japanese season in contravention of Japanese law.  CCSBT, Report of the Resumed 
Third Annual Meeting (Revised), 3-5 (1997), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/report_of_ccsbt3_part2.pdf.  Japan subsequently reported that 
the incident had led to overcatch of its national allocation by 308 tonnes.  Id. at 4.  The 
purpose of the Compliance Committee was thus to provide a vehicle for members to 
pressure each other to return to compliance as soon as possible.  The delay was caused by 
debate between New Zealand (supported by Australia) and Japan regarding the 
Committee’s terms of reference, principally, the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement’s 
provisions on collaborative compliance action, including high seas vessel inspections.  
See id. at 12-13.  An abortive decision to convene the Compliance Committee was also 
made at the Fifth Meeting.  CCSBT5(1) Report, supra note 67, at 2.   
 70. See CCSBT, Report of the First Meeting of the Compliance Committee (2006), 
available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_CC1.pdf. 
 71. Infra, text at notes 98-105. 
 72. See Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, Attorney-General’s 
Department, Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995 (as amended up to 
Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/ 
legislativeinstrumentcompilation1.nsf/0/E4FC3C884F1FC2B0CA2573FD00236F85/$file
46 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
include bycatch.  In reporting to the 1988 management meeting that its 
fishery plan had been amended to delete provision for incidental catch, 
so that all commercial catch had to be covered by quota,73 Australia 
disclosed that bycatch had been around four to five tonnes per annum.74 
The 1988 meeting report records one of the few instances of one 
State arguing that another State should compensate it for the latter’s 
excessive catch, albeit with somewhat loose use of the term 
“responsibility,” as no breach of an obligation was asserted.75  Seeking to 
maintain its share of the catch, Japan contended that “large catches [by 
Australia] of small fish in the 1982-83 year were responsible for current 
low catch levels,” and it advocated that “those who caused the decline 
should take responsibility for the consequences.”76 
Serious allegations of overcatch were made at the 1990 management 
meeting, when Australia, noting that Japan’s methods of estimating when 
its quota would be reached had the effect of allowing the fishery to 
remain in operation after its 6065 tonne limit had been exceeded, 
outlined concerns about “the extent to which Japanese vessels may have 
under-reported SBT catch in the 1990 season.”77  Japan’s explanation as 
understood by the Australian rapporteur was that it:  
estimates the seasons [sic] catch by extrapolating from CPUE of 
the previous two years to get an estimated CPUE for the current 
season and uses this to calculate the expected date upon which 
                                                                                                                                  
/SthBluefinTunaFishMgmentPlan1995.pdf (continuing the system of individual 
transferable quotas originally established in 1984).  The Management Plan has the status 
of delegated legislation made pursuant to the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Austl.).   
 73. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, Seventh Round, at 2 
(unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files). 
 74. Note that the small amounts involved would not have caused Australia actually to 
exceed its catch limits.  Id. at 8. 
 75. See id at 14. 
 76. Id. at 14.  No doubt part of the reason why Australia and New Zealand did not 
find this persuasive was that Japan simultaneously claimed credit for its past catches as 
an historic “contribution” to the fishery. Id. at 9.  The claim is not, however, entirely 
nonsensical.  In the early years of a fishery, when the biomass is still well above Bmsy, 
large catches serve to reduce that biomass towards Bmsy, thus enhancing the stock’s 
productivity.  The risk of course is that continuing large catches overshoot and drive the 
stock below Bmsy, at which point they begin to damage the fishery.   
 77. P. Enright, Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT, at 21 
(1990) (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files) [hereinafter Draft 
1990 Summary Record].   
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the quota would be reached.  This method gives a conservative 
date for closure of the fishery when the CPUE is decreasing.78 
Yet, while the CPUE had remained stable overall in recent years, it 
had “risen dramatically off Tasmania over the last two years.”  In these 
circumstances, Japan noted, “it was easy to catch over quota, and this 
was not at all unusual when the factors operating in this fishery were 
considered.”79 
New Zealand did not immediately accept this as a sufficient excuse:  
New Zealand is of the view that all parties should ensure that 
national allocations are strictly adhered to, and that to this end 
monitoring and surveillance activities should be strengthened.  
New Zealand would expect any party that had over-caught its 
allocation to take responsible voluntary action to deal with the 
situation.80  
Australia was similarly unimpressed, stating that it did not “regard it 
as acceptable for Japanese industry to expect that it can blatantly flout 
the agreements made to save the fishery from extinction, and adhered to 
at great cost by Australia, without making some adjustment to 
compensate for the overfishing which has taken place.”81  
In response, Japan appeared to deny any obligation to make such a 
compensatory adjustment.  It accepted that more precise methods of 
catch management were desirable, but argued that “the punitive measures 
proposed go too far . . . .  Last year Australia allocated quota to 
fishermen before agreement on the quota was reached, but Japan never 
demanded punitive measures.  If Australia insists on punitive measures 
for Japan, Japan may insist upon punitive measures for Australia.”82 
                                                          
 78. Id.  CPUE stands for “catch per unit effort,” which is frequently used as a 
surrogate measure of fish abundance, although it is not necessarily directly proportional 
to it.  The Japanese longline fishery expresses its CPUE as the number of SBT caught per 
thousand hooks set.  A. CATON, K. MCLOUGHLIN & M. J. WILLIAMS, SOUTHERN BLUEFIN 
TUNA: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE 17 (1990). 
 79. Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra note 77, at 9, 21. 
 80. New Zealand Statement for Plenary Session of Ninth Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Management Talks, at 4 (1990) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from 
DPIE files). 
 81. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral negotiations – Australian Statement to Plenary 
Session, at 2 (1990) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files). 
 82. Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra note 77, at 30.  Japan also stated that 
“[Australia’s action in 1989] allowing fishing to commence before the end of talks was 
jumping the gun.  This sort of action will damage the trilateral cooperative framework.”  
Draft Transcript of Japanese Opening Statement, at 1 (Sept. 25, 1990) (unpublished, copy 
48 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
The following year, Japan reported that it had restricted the number 
of vessels and set seasons for each fishing ground.83  It was expecting to 
have filled its quota by September 30, and would therefore close the 
season on that date.84  New Zealand responded by noting “the difficulties 
of monitoring the catch of vessels on the high seas in real-time, but 
hoped that Japan had been able to establish a better system.”85  Japan’s 
reply was that “while having difficulty in monitoring 200 SBT fishing 
boats, Japan was implementing a new monitoring and enforcement 
system, including a new radio reporting system, together with restrictions 
on vessel numbers and length of season, and random inspections at time 
of unloading.”86 
The explanation for New Zealand’s milder attitude may be that in 
1990, New Zealand had itself exceeded its quota because of 
unexpectedly good fishing conditions:  
New Zealand regretted the over-catch in 1990, explaining that it 
was due to a number of factors: it was difficult to monitor a 
small quota in real-time with a large number of vessels over a 
short time frame, and fishing conditions were particularly good 
that year.  As a result of the over-catch, action was taken to 
ensure more accurate monitoring of catches as they occur.  It is 
now possible to close the fishery as soon as the limit is reached.  
Fishermen who continue to fish after this are liable to a $5000 
fine.87 
                                                                                                                                  
held by author extracted from DPIE files).  It may be speculated that, had the 1990 
Summary Record ever been finalized, Japan on reflection would have asked for its 
surprisingly incautious statement to be omitted, for it presupposes that Australia had 
thereby breached a rule that there must be no fishing before quotas are agreed upon.  If 
there were such a rule, however, this would have allowed Australia, by withholding 
agreement, to impose in that or a future year the very moratorium it had without success 
advocated in 1989.  See THE HON R.J.L. HAWKE AC, OUR COUNTRY, OUR FUTURE: 
STATEMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1989). 
 83. Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT, at 1 (1991) 
(unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files). 
 84. Id. at 1-2. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  Japan commented that “compared to New Zealand’s small catch limit, the 
level of overcatch was significant.”  Id. at 1.  New Zealand’s catch of 529 tonnes in 1990 
was 109 tonnes above its 420-tonne quota.  See CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific 
Committee for the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, Attachment 4 (2005), 
available at www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_SC10.pdf 
[hereinafter CCSBT-ESC4 Report].  While it made no mention of a compensating 
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Japan’s problem, however, remained unresolved.  At the 1992 
management meeting, Australia and New Zealand expressed “serious 
concern” over three consecutive years of catch by the Japanese longline 
fleet in excess of national allocation,88 although the report contains no 
mention of a compensating adjustment to future catch limits. 
Only one incident of note occurred in the second phase, which 
differed from the previous examples, all of unplanned overcatch.  A 
controversy erupted when Australia proposed to catch in the current year 
one hundred tonnes of the next year’s quota, in order to alleviate a 
specific problem faced by its longliners operating off New South 
Wales.89  At the management meeting later that year, New Zealand said 
that Australia’s action “threatened the integrity of the trilateral 
management process.”90  Acknowledging New Zealand’s concerns, 
Australia confirmed that it would fully apply its “stringent quota 
provisions” to the quota brought forward and make a compensatory 
hundred-tonne reduction in the 1993-94 quota year.91  Australia noted 
that it had never exceeded its quota and that it hoped that all parties 
would abide by their quota levels and institute effective measures to 
prevent overcatch in the future.92  Japan did not oppose the Australian 
action on the basis that it was a “one-off decision taken to address 
specific difficult domestic circumstances.”93  
                                                                                                                                  
adjustment for 1991, the catch in that year was so low (164 tonnes, id.) that tonne-for-
tonne compensation was more than achieved in fact.   
 88. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, at 5 (1992) 
(unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files). 
 89. According to a press report, the New Zealand High Commission confirmed that 
the New Zealand Minister of Fisheries, Mr. Kidd, had written on this matter to his 
Australian counterpart, Mr. Lee, but declined to give details.  David Mussared, NZ 
protest letter to Australian Fisheries, CANBERRA TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 13. 
 90. Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions—First Session—Draft 
Summary Record, at 6 (1993) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from 
DPIE files).   
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  See also Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, at 8 
(1993) (unpublished, copy on file with author extracted from DPIE files).  Australia’s 
willingness to take a 100-tonne reduction, even if its excess catch was less than that, may 
be contrasted with Japan’s (uncontested) claim in 2001 that, based on its actual 
commercial catch of 5354 tonnes, it had forgone 711 tonnes (rather than the 700 implied 
by the calculation below) under the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) provisional measure requiring it to limit the sum of its total catches (commercial 
and experimental) in 1999 and 2000 to 12,130 tonnes.  See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases 
(N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999: Request for Provisional 
Measures, 39 I.L.M. 1624 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999), ¶ 90.1(c) and (d).  This was 
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In all likelihood, Japan either felt that, given its own history of over-
catch, it was in no position to object to Australia’s request, or it was 
aware that this history would likely continue, as at the CCSBT’s 
inaugural meeting a few months later it reported overcatch of 250 tonnes 
in 1993.94  The 1993 Convention does contain a formal quota-setting 
mechanism, but, since it would need to be activated at the first meeting, 
it could not apply until the fishing year after its entry into force.95  The 
objective of the 1993 Convention is “to ensure, through appropriate 
management, the conservation and optimum utilisation” of SBT.96  
Advancing one hundred tonnes of catch, or less than 2% of Australia’s 
national allocation, by a year might make the attainment of these goals 
marginally more difficult,97 but the better view is that it is not contrary to 
them.  The fact that Australia took care to consult its trilateral partners 
before acting leads to the conclusion that, despite their differing 
reactions, Australia would in all likelihood have seen off any legal 
challenge to its actions, although the possibility of its success cannot be 
entirely dismissed. 
Japan’s attitude was the first to show evident change in the third 
phase.  Its reaction to the spotting of the forty Japanese fishing vessels by 
Australian reconnaissance aircraft in December 1996, leading to Japan’s 
total catch being recalculated at 6373 tonnes, was to debit the 308 
tonnes’ excess against the Japanese national allocation for the 1997 
fishing year, as noted above.98 
                                                                                                                                  
even though Japan had opted to set itself a catch limit of 5365 tonnes for the relevant 
fishing year, seven hundred tonnes below its most recent national allocation from the 
CCSBT, as its first installment towards compliance with the ITLOS Order. 
 94. CCSBT1 Report, supra note 69, at 3.   
 95. 1993 Convention, supra note 53, art. 8. 
 96. Id. art. 3. 
 97. Repayment by Australia of this small amount to the stock within one year would 
not necessarily leave the stock in exactly the same position as if it had adhered to its 
catch limit (marginal added catch when a fish stock is depleted risks causing greater loss 
to the stock than the amount of the additional catch).  See the eighteenth criticism of 
Japan’s experimental fishing program by Dr. Serge Garcia, a senior FAO fisheries 
official, cited to ITLOS by counsel for Australia, Professor Crawford, as evidence for the 
inadequacy of Japan’s offer to pay back to the stock its experimental catch if it could be 
shown to have damaged it.  Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan) 
ITLOS/PV.99/21/Rev.2 (Aug. 18, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/ 
case_documents/2001/document_en_140.pdf, at 24.  On the other hand, this low level of 
tonnage and short timeframe mean that the dismal phenomenon of borrowings requiring 
much larger repayments than the amount borrowed in order to counteract their effect on 
the stock (see infra note 240 and accompanying text) could probably have been avoided.  
 98. See supra text accompanying note 68; CCSBT4(1), supra note 65, at ¶¶ 1(2), 2.  
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This informal self-policing system continued until the major crisis of 
2006, when Japan was shown by market data to have been significantly 
overcatching its national allocation for many years, leading to a cut of 
3065 tonnes per annum for five years thereafter.99  Even then, the 
“nominal catch” remains at 6065 tonnes, while it is the “allocated catch” 
that falls to 3000 tonnes.  This is likely to be because, under the 1993 
Convention, 70% of the CCSBT’s costs are divided in proportion to the 
parties’ “nominal catches.”100  Japan for many years had been bearing a 
share lower than its actual catch would have warranted if authorized in 
advance, and the unchanged nominal catch allows other parties to recoup 
some of their contributions.  Note, though, that compensation based on a 
standard recalculation should be relatively easy to achieve once Japan’s 
actual catch for the years in question is determined.  What is not clear is 
whether there is any appetite among the parties to do this. 
Before then, the CCSBT had never itself had to reduce a member’s 
national allocation to compensate for past overcatch.  National 
allocations were left unchanged on the understanding that an amount 
corresponding to past overcatch would not be used.  The same system 
continued even in the absence of TACs in 1998-2003, applied to the 
members’ voluntary quotas, though in recent years the pattern has been 
for overcatch in one year to be paid back not in the immediately 
following year, but in the year after that.101  A possible explanation for 
this lag is that, by the time the catch figures for a year are compiled, the 
limit for the next year will have already been set, and there may be 
domestic administrative law reasons why a catch limit may not be 
reduced mid-season.  Even if not, there may be a political reluctance to 
do so.102  
                                                          
 99. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, ¶ 
60, at 13 (2006), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/ 
report_of_CCSBT13.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC5 Report]. 
 100. See 1993 Convention, supra note 54, art. 11(2)(b).  
 101. This collective nonchalance towards prompt offsetting of the overcatch 
necessitated by the depleted state of the stock, see supra note 80, seems rather lax by 
comparison with the stringent standard set in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 2000 (second) 
Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
on the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise, see 
Molenaar, supra note 51, at 120-21.  The latter bespeaks a more serious determination to 
prevent overcatch and, it may be thought, should be preferred on that ground alone.   
 102. Evidenced by the rule introduced by ICCAT in 1991 that “if the catch of [a 
relevant State] exceeds its annual or biannual scientific monitoring quota, then in the 
biannual period or year following reporting of that catch to [the Commission], that [State] 
will reduce its catch to compensate in total for that overage.” ICCAT, Report for Biennial 
Period 1990-91 Part II (1991), at 67 (1992), available at http://www.iccat.int/ 
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Thus, Japan began the 2003 season with a catch limit reduced to 
5839 tonnes, reflecting a catch in the 2001 season 226 tonnes over its 
voluntary limit, but not a further 127-tonne overcatch in 2002,103 which 
was instead repaid in 2004.104  An exception is New Zealand, where 
fishing is temporally concentrated into a short enough period for the 
reduction to be made in the immediately following season.  For instance, 
                                                                                                                                  
Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_90-91_II.pdf (emphasis added).  A two-year rule was 
established for this reason in the “Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding 
Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries,” ICCAT, Report for 
Biennial Period 1998-99 Part I (1998), Vol. I, 76 (1999), available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_98-99_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT 
Green Book 1999/1], which was extended by the “Supplemental Recommendation by 
ICCAT Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries,” 
ICCAT Report for Biennial Period 2000-01 Part II (2001), Vol. I, 217 (2002), available 
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf.  A contingent 
125% compensation standard in these fisheries is applicable if quota is exceeded during 
two consecutive management periods.  See ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 1996-
97 Part I (1996), Vol. I, 95 (1997), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/ 
BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1997/1].  This rule 
was extended to the southern swordfish stock in the “Recommendation by ICCAT 
Regarding Compliance in the South Atlantic Swordfish Fishery.”  ICCAT, Report for the 
Biennial Period 1996-97 Part II (1997), Vol. I, 70 (1998), available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_II_1.pdf.  The present 
generalized rule is in the “Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Compliance with 
Management Measures which Define Quotas and/or Catch Limits:” 
For any species under quota/catch limit management, underages/overages from 
one year may be added/must be subtracted from the quota/catch limit of the 
management period immediately after or one year after that year, unless any 
recommendation on a stock specifically deals with overages/underages, in which 
case that recommendation will take precedence. 
ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2000-01 Part I (2000), Vol. I, 148 (2001), available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green 
Book 2001/1].  The rule thus yields to the two years specified as the norm in the 
“Recommendation by ICCAT Relating to the Rebuilding Program for North Atlantic 
Swordfish,” ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03 Part I (2002), Vol. I, Annex 
8.2, at 157 (2003), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/ BienRep/REP_EN_02-
03_I_1.pdf [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2003/1], and in the “Recommendation by 
ICCAT Concerniing [sic] a Multi-Year Conservation and Management Plan for Bluefin 
Tuna in the East Atlantic and Mediterranean,” id., Annex 8.8, at 167.  
 103. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-3, ¶ 4(4).   
 104. CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, 
Attachment 8-3, ¶ 4(5) (2007), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_14/report_of_CCSBT14.pdf [hereinafter CCSBT-EC6 Report].  
Sixty-nine tonnes left uncaught in 2003 were added back at the same time, id., Japan 
claiming permission to do so because there was no binding CCSBT decision for that year, 
id. at 8, ¶ 47.  
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overcatch of sixteen tonnes in 1994 was paid back in 1995, thirty-seven 
tonnes from 1999 was repaid in 2000, approximately twenty tonnes’ 
overcatch from 2000 was repaid in 2001, and the thirty-two tonnes of 
overcatch from 2001 was accounted for in 2002.105 
In 2003, Australia reported an incident to the CCSBT which was not 
treated as overcatch, though it now would be under the remedial 
measures adopted to prevent its repetition.  A quantity of captured SBT 
estimated at 132 tonnes had escaped from a tow cage before it had 
reached the pens where the sampling process to determine its weight 
would have taken place.106  On the best available information, fifteen 
tonnes of SBT died in the incident, which was the amount debited 
against the holder’s individual quota.107  As a result, Australia decided to 
move from the system of deducting quota when the fish were transferred 
from tow cages to static cages (including mortalities during the catching 
and towing operations) to a provisional deduction of the estimated 
weight at the time of capture.108   
Since April 1, 2006, in response to the revelations of persistent past 
overcatch, Japan has adhered to a system of individual vessel quotas, 
allowing for the use of 142 vessels per year, with landing of SBT 
restricted to eight designated ports, all to be monitored by government 
                                                          
 105. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 63, at 10; CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 9, 
¶ 49; CCSBT, Report of the Special Meeting, at 6, ¶ 36 (2000), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_special_meeting.pdf; 
CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, at 1.  Given that the reported 
overcatch of twenty tonnes in 2000 included twenty-three tonnes of Pacific bluefin 
tuna—a different species—it appears that there was in fact no overcatch of SBT by New 
Zealand in that year, which makes the repayment somewhat puzzling.  CCSBT, Report of 
the Seventh Annual Meeting, ¶ 10 (April 18-21, 2001), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_7/report_of_ccsbt7.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT7 Report].  Another curiosity is that, at the time of New Zealand’s original 
announcement at the CCSBT’s 2002 meeting that it had overcaught its voluntary limit for 
the 2001-02 season by thirty-two tonnes, it undertook to refrain from catching a 
commensurate amount only in the 2003-04 season.  CCSBT, Report of the Extended 
Commission of the Ninth Annual Meeting, ¶ 35, at 6 (Oct. 15-18, 2002), available at, 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_9/report_of_ccsbt9.pdf [hereinafter 
CCSBT-EC1 Report].  Taiwan also reacted rapidly to its 158-tonne overcatch in 2004, 
announcing that it would be paid back in 2005.  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra note 64, 
Attachment 8-2. 
 106. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 4, ¶ 31.   
 107. Id.  A separate 126-tonne overcatch was, however, debited against the next year’s 
allocation.  CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the Ninth Meeting 
of the Scientific Committee, at 2, ¶ 9 (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/ 
pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_sc9.pdf.   
 108. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 4, ¶ 31.   
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inspectors.109  Each fish must be individually tagged with a serial number 
and the vessel’s call sign.110  Penalties for infringement are severe and 
could result in suspension of quota for up to five years.111 
B. Institutionalized Carryover of Overcatch and Undercatch 
Although adherence to quotas is undeniably important for conserving 
fish stocks, a limited degree of flexibility around them may assist 
fisheries management.  Allowing a modest proportion of uncaught quota 
to be carried over into the next year removes the “use it or lose it” 
incentive to try to fill the quota, with its inherent risk of overcatch.  
Conversely, permitting a small amount of overcatch to be debited against 
the following year’s quota may act as a political safety valve, offering 
States facing domestic pressures to allow overfishing the alternative of 
legitimately borrowing small amounts from the stock, provided there are 
guarantees of repayment (as, in fact, occurred in the second-phase 
incident of 1993).  Although, as seen, a system along these lines has 
developed ad hoc in the CCSBT, a suggestion that one be introduced 
formally led to nothing.  At the Eighth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2001, 
Australia indicated that it was prepared to countenance members being 
permitted to reconcile their catch against national allocations over a 
three-year period with limits so as to provide operational flexibility, but 
not if those allocations were increased from their last levels.112  As there 
was no agreement on national allocations, this could not be pursued. 
Australia’s 2002 overcatch, which was caused by a single operator, 
highlights an additional complex consequence where there are individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) at the domestic level, but no year-to-year 
accounting mechanism allowing an individual quota-holder’s overrun to 
be debited against the holder’s quota for the following year.  If, in that 
situation, the State concerned adheres to established CCSBT practice by 
declaring a commensurately lower domestic catch limit in the following 
year, all quota-holders, whose quota is expressed in terms of a fixed 
share of the total, compensate for the overcatch of one.  This also creates 
a powerful incentive for compliance-oriented peer pressure within the 
fleet as long as overcatchers cannot remain anonymous—as was the case 
here. 
                                                          
 109. CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, Attachment 12-5, app. 3. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment N-1.  
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At the CCSBT’s 2004 meeting, New Zealand advised that the 
introduction of SBT into its Quota Management System with certain 
flexibility provisions was expected to affect its ability to balance catch 
from one year to the next, “however NZ will ensure that on average the 
catch from the fishery does not exceed the national allocation.”113  In not 
seeking the CCSBT’s blessing for this, New Zealand thus appeared to be 
implicitly asserting a claim to be permitted to do it on the basis that it 
was by now established practice of other members.  If so, its assessment 
was correct: there were no protests.  In substance, however, New 
Zealand’s action was not very different from the unauthorized averaging 
Taiwan had been conducting and which it undertook to cease when it 
was exposed by the Trade Information Scheme.114 
At the 2007 meeting, New Zealand tabled a draft resolution that 
would allow for carryover of undercatch into the immediately following 
year, but only if the national allocation for the next year was not less than 
in the year of undercatch.  Overcatch of 10% would be permitted without 
penalty for a member whose national allocation was 500 tonnes or less, 
and 2% for one of more than 500 tonnes, with penalties increasing in 
three steps: 50%, 100%, and 200%; the highest rate reached at 50% 
overcatch for a member whose national allocation was 500 tonnes or less 
and 10% for others.115  The overcatch and any penalty would be deducted 
over the following two years.116   
Taiwan and Korea supported the proposal, as did Australia in 
principle, though in its view the percentages required refinement so as to 
avoid giving an economic incentive to overcatch.  Japan had concerns 
about carry-forward of undercatch given the low state of the SBT stock 
and wished to consider the detail of the proposal further.117  New Zealand 
was left to redraft the text in advance of the next meeting.118 
Until this development, ICCAT had been somewhat more advanced 
than CCSBT.  Carryovers were already permitted in the northern 
                                                          
 113. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶ 8. 
 114. See infra note 211.  In 2002, Taiwan admitted that it had managed its catch on a 
five-year average of 1450 tonnes, though it would introduce yearly catch limits to replace 
this.  Thus, despite its catches in 1999 and 2000 of 1513 and 1638 tonnes respectively, 
Taiwan calculated its average catch over 1996-2000 as 1387 tonnes.  CCSBT8 Report, 
supra note 66, at 6, ¶ 38.  
 115. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, Attachment 12, ¶ 4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 25, ¶¶ 134-37.  
 118. Id. at 26, ¶ 140. 
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albacore fishery, though not until 2007 in its southern counterpart.119  In 
2004, the European Community had proposed that there be a general rule 
for management and application of unders and overs, but debate on this 
matter was thrice deferred to 2007. When the debate did occur the 
Community withdrew its proposal in favor of a new alternative from the 
U.S., which failed to be adopted for lack of support.120  In the original 
draft recommendation tabled by the Community,121 there was an unclear 
distinction between “management measures” (for which overcatch would 
be debited against the next year’s allocation or that of the subsequent 
year, whereas undercatch of up to 10% could be carried forward into 
future years, subject to a cumulative maximum of 30%; it is not clear 
what effect a change in national allocation in the interim would have had 
on the last figure) and “application measures” (for which overage would 
always be debited in the next year, and at a rate of 125% if it occurred in 
two years in succession).  It may not be coincidental that the Community 
lost interest in promoting its idea just when its own 2006 overcatch of the 
eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna (ABT) came to be brought to 
account.  Arguing in mitigation that quota would have been available to 
cover the excess had it not declined to carry forward its undercatch of 
2004, the Community persuaded its fellow members to let it repay the 
                                                          
 119. ICCAT’s original 50% carryover limit for the northern albacore stock has now 
been reduced to 25%.  See ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2002-03 Part II (2003), 
Vol. 1, at 144, ¶ 6 (2004) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/1], available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_1.pdf; ICCAT, Report for 
Biennial Period 2006-07 Part II (2007), Vol. 1, ¶ 6, at 150 (2008) [hereinafter ICCAT 
Green Book 2008/1], available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/ 
REP_EN_06-07_II_1.pdf.  See also ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2004-05 Part I, 
Vol. 1, at 130 (2005) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2005/1] available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_04-05_I_1.pdf.  For the bigeye stock, 
a maximum of 30% of underage may be carried over to either of the next two years.  Id. 
at 126. 
 120. It was first deferred in 2004.  See ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 
191.  In 2005 it was deferred for a second time, when the Standing Committee on 
Research and Statistics was asked to provide scientific advice on the possible 
conservation impacts on a stock-by-stock basis of carrying forward undercatch.  See 
ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 216.  The third and final deferral was in 
2006.  See ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra note 9, at 241.  See also ICCAT Green 
Book 2008/1, supra note 119, at 40 (providing the very brief report of the consideration 
of the European and U.S. proposals).   
 121. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 255. 
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excess over not two, but three years122—something not foreseen by the 
existing regulation, so that an amendment to it had to be adopted.123 
On the other hand, possibly because of the large tonnages involved, 
Taiwan’s overcatch of 8000 tonnes of bigeye tuna, and China’s 
overcatch of an unspecified amount, were permitted to be compensated 
for by yearly deductions of 1600 tonnes and 500 tonnes, respectively, 
from 2005 to 2009.124  ICCAT’s Working Group, considering the 
development of a compendium of its recommendations and resolutions, 
has also requested clarification from the parent commission of how 
overcatch and undercatch of transferred quotas should be treated.125  
C. Conversion Factors 
Before each fish can be measured and weighed, it is often necessary 
to carry out some initial processing, such as gilling and gutting.  Since 
national allocations of SBT are by necessary implication in whole weight 
(the only common measurement that allows like to be compared with 
like), a formula is needed for converting the weight of every processed 
fish into what it would have weighed at the moment of its capture.  An 
inaccurate conversion factor can lead to an overcatch of quota, deliberate 
or not, that would otherwise be difficult to detect.126  There would thus 
seem to be a need to impose uniform conversion factors (or at least a 
formula relating whole weight to processed weight for different weights 
                                                          
 122. ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra note 119, at 215, 218. 
 123. Id. at 152.  Though not opposing this recommendation, the U.S. called for the 
compliance process to be reformed, id. at 248-49, and decried ICCAT’s “overall picture 
of persistent compliance lapses” and “unwillingness to apply the available corrective 
instruments, namely quota penalties,” id. at 249. 
 124. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 126.  Note, however, that Japan 
calculated China’s 2003 overage as 3903 tonnes, an amount greater than the 2500 tonnes 
implied by the decision.  Id. at 245.  The combination of this discrepancy and the lack of 
a precise figure for China’s overcatch in the report suggests that the figure was disputed 
and that the decision ultimately made was a compromise. 
 125. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 122-23.  Failing to receive an 
answer to its specific question as to whether the 50% northern albacore carry-over in ¶ 6 
of the relevant recommendation was applicable to the catch limit of 200 tonnes available 
by ¶ 3 to any member not mentioned by name, the following year the Working Group 
submitted to the Commission for approval its own affirmative answer.  ICCAT Green 
Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 143-44.   
 126. Or, as the Commission coyly put it, “inappropriate conversion factors will 
influence the number of fish which may be taken within the quota.” CCSBT, Report of 
the Second Annual Meeting, at 6 (1995), available at www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_ccsbt2.pdf. 
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of fish and different processing techniques).  The CCSBT has not done 
this, but in 1996 noted a report from its Scientific Committee indicating 
that a conversion factor of 1.15 that the members’ scientists used had 
proved to be unsatisfactory.127  According to Australia and New Zealand, 
it had resulted in the total weight of the longline catch being 
underestimated.128  On the other hand, Japan considered that because the 
current TAC had been calculated on current conversion factors, the 
CCSBT should adjust the TAC commensurately if it were to adopt the 
Scientific Committee’s new conversion factor.129  Australia and New 
Zealand acknowledged this the following year,130 and the CCSBT has not 
since taken any action on the matter. 
D. Farmed Fish 
The farming of fish can be a complicating factor, as has been the 
case in respect of Australia’s farming of SBT at Port Lincoln in South 
Australia.  The reason is twofold.   
First, because farmed fish are not killed at capture, it is much more 
difficult to ascertain their weight at that time, which is the significant 
weight for quota purposes.  This matter has been raised in the CCSBT, 
where in 1996 Japan questioned Australia’s procedure for estimating 
tonnages of farmed fish catches to debit against its quota. Japan 
highlighted the likely high mortality of purse-seined fish, suggested that 
the fish could lose weight subsequent to capture, and emphasized the 
need for observers on the vessels.131  In response, Australia advised that 
                                                          
 127. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 15.  In Australia, under Regulation 7 of the 
Fisheries Management (Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery) Regulations 1995, the 
conversion factor from processed weight to whole weight is 1.176.  New Zealand law 
provides for a conversion factor for gilled and gutted SBT of 1.15 if the tail is removed, 
or 1.10 if the tail is left on.  Fisheries (Conversion Factors) Notice 2005, Schedule 2, Part 
II, item 26, available at www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/E264B2E8-4B02-4FA5-8540-
91B737D45499/0/CFNoticeSchedules.pdf. 
 128. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 19, 20, 22. 
 129. Id. at 22.  It follows from the circumstances that the adjustment would have been 
upwards. This appears justified since the stock assessments are conducted on the basis of 
number of fish, not weight. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 12.  This is 
corroborated by the Scientific Committee’s comment that, as long as the same conversion 
factor is used both in the projections and in calculating removals from the fishery, it 
should not result in any bias in the projections.  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 3 
(reference not reproduced in PDF; full document on file with the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Marine Division). 
 130. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 12. 
 131. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 11. 
2010] Internationally Managed Fisheries 59 
 
all transfers were monitored by compliance staff, and that fish were 
counted using underwater video and sampled for weight to develop a 
tonnage estimate.132  There was an obligation to report all mortalities 
occurring at capture and prior to transfer to rearing cages for debit 
against quota.133  Dead fish were removed from cages during the towing 
process and their weight duly debited.134  The mortality during towing 
and transferring was reported at 1.4% in the 1995 season and 1.5% in 
1996.135  Since feeding in tow cages commenced soon after capture, they 
might well have gained weight during the two or three weeks between 
their capture and arrival in the Port Lincoln fish farms.136   
Updating this information some years later, Australia advised that in 
the 2000 and 2001 seasons compliance officers from the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) were deployed on farm tow 
vessels to observe procedures.137  AFMA also conducted boat inspections 
in port and monitored all transfers of fish to farm cages.138  In response to 
further questioning in 2002, Australia confirmed that mortalities in 
purse-seines and tow cages were factored into the catch data presented to 
the CCSBT.139  At the CCSBT’s 2003 Meeting, Australia advised that 
specific procedures had been introduced for research and monitoring of 
SBT farming operations.140  An independent company was contracted 
annually by AFMA to monitor the operations.141  All mortalities 
occurring during the capture and towing operations must be recorded on 
the appropriate form and be available for inspection if requested by an 
AFMA officer.142  When SBT are transferred from tow cages to the fish 
farms, a video recording must be made by the contractor, which is then 
used to count the fish transferred into the farm.143  This count is 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra note 105, at 5.  See also CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra 
note 66, at Attachment 8.1. 
 140. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  This requirement has been enacted into Australian law.  See Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995, c. 22A (Austl.), supra note 72. 
 143. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7.  This requirement has 
also been enacted into Australian law.  See Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management 
Plan 1995, c. 22B.1-.2 (Austl.), supra note 72. 
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multiplied by the mean weight derived from a sample of 40 fish, and 
debited against the quota using the Farm Disposal Record.144 
Second, even if, on the strength of the procedures just listed, the 
reported weights are assumed to be free of any systematic downward 
bias, with almost all of Australia’s SBT catch now fattened further in the 
farms, the weight of these fish when ultimately sent to market will be 
substantially higher than at their time of capture. Starting in 1997, 
Japanese import statistics began to show imports of SBT from Australia 
to be greater than Australia’s quota of 5265 tonnes: more than 6000 
tonnes in 1997 and 1998; nearly 7000 tonnes in 1999; and over 7800 
tonnes in 2000.145   
In response to Japan’s questioning of Australia’s adherence to its 
quota, Australia gave information to the CCSBT showing that its catch 
never exceeded its national allocation.  At a 1997 meeting, Australia 
reported an average mortality of SBT after counting of 5%, with an 
average time spent in pens of around four months.146  The losses were 
mainly due to seals, parasites, and storms.147  At the CCSBT’s Seventh 
Meeting in 2001, Australia advised that it would carry out a scientific 
assessment of growth rates of farmed SBT,148 and at the Eighth Meeting 
later that year Australia presented a paper on growth rates on farms, 
reporting that “weight increases in the order of 93% were being obtained 
from farming SBT, and [that] further increases could be expected as 
techniques improved.”149   
The issue remains controversial and the subject of close questioning 
by Japan at CCSBT meetings, possibly as a tactic to divert attention from 
the issue of Japan’s past overcatch, since from 2006 onwards it has 
invariably been raised in association with the latter.150  Although doubts 
                                                          
 144. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 7.  This requirement has 
been enacted into Australian law.  See Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 
1995, c. 22B.2 (Austl.), supra note 72. 
 145. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-2, app. 2. 
 146. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, Attachment P, ¶ 2. 
 147. Id. 
 148. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, ¶ 31. 
 149. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 6.  If 98% of Australia’s annual quota of 5265 
tonnes were farmed and exported to Japan after a weight increase of 93%, only imports 
above 9958 tonnes would conclusively indicate overcatch, and then, only if it occurred in 
two successive years (because catch takes time to reach the market and the quota year is 
not the same as the calendar year used in Japan’s trade statistics). See infra note 191.  In 
2001, however, Japan imported only 8237 tonnes of SBT from Australia..  CCSBT-EC2 
Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-3, ¶ 8(3).  It is unclear, however, whether the 93% is 
gross or net of losses. 
 150. See generally infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. 
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about the Australian accounting procedure were not wholly dispelled at a 
special meeting on the two issues, the CCSBT as a whole in taking no 
remedial action appears to have accepted Australia’s criticisms that the 
statistical methods used to generate these doubts are flawed; two 
members of the independent panel found that the data were not 
sufficiently robust to support any finding of overcatch, while the other 
two, though agreeing, proceeded nonetheless to produce from those data 
estimates of overcatch ranging from 18% to 49.5%.151  If anything, the 
fact that fish smaller than 10 kg are excluded from the forty-fish sample 
produces an upward bias, which, according to an independent expert, 
would lead to a likely overestimate of catch by 2%-4%.152  The 
Independent Review of Australian SBT Farming Operations Anomalies 
also concluded that “the regulation of the industry is a rigorous and well 
managed process with no apparent anomalies and no scope for over-
catch via misreporting.”153   
Instead, at Japan’s request, Australia was to carry out a study 
beginning in 2007 to estimate: (a) representativeness or bias of the forty-
fish sample used to estimate weight; (b) weight change during towing; 
(c) accuracy in the counting of dead fish during towing; (d) accuracy in 
growth rate during farming; and (e) the number of fish transferred into 
farming pens.  Australia hoped to finalize (a), (c), and (e) during the first 
year and planned to report to the Scientific Committee in time for its 
annual meeting in mid-2007.154  This was not entirely achieved, but an 
extensive debate was held on the matter at the 2007 meeting.155 
Japan has mounted similar arguments in ICCAT regarding farming 
of ABT by Croatia and Turkey (with similar responses from those 
States156) resulting in the adoption of successive recommendations on the 
matter.157  In 2002, a working group debated tuna farming, and in 2003, 
                                                          
 151. CCSBT, Report of the Fifth Special Meeting of the Commission, app. 3, at 2, ¶¶ 8-
12 and Attachment 7 (2006) available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ 
ccsbt_13/report_of_special_meeting_2006.pdf. 
 152. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 8, ¶ 48. 
 153. Id. at 20, ¶ 106.  It is not clear whether the original report, which the CCSBT has 
not made public, is also the source of the estimate in the previous footnote. 
 154. CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 7-8, ¶¶ 42-44. 
 155. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 15-20, ¶¶ 91-107.  See also id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 
48-51. 
 156. ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 230-32.  See also id. at 233-35; 
ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 206.    
 157. The original was the “Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Farming.”  
See ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra note 102, at 171.  The current one at the time of 
writing, which completely replaced its predecessor (despite its title) is the 
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there was further discussion in one of ICCAT’s species panels, where the 
European Community said that “farming does not constitute, in itself, a 
threat to fish stocks, as long as it is carefully monitored and 
controlled.”158  Japan, by contrast, was concerned principally about 
farming by non-members of ICCAT.159 
E. Bycatch and Discarding 
Although prohibition on the taking of fish below a certain size is a 
common fisheries management measure,160 either directly (as is the only 
option in the case of longlining, in which the hooks do not discriminate 
between fish of different sizes) or in terms of mesh size of nets, the 
CCSBT has not sought, at any stage, to regulate the SBT fisheries on this 
basis.  The size of fish taken is significant because of its differential 
impact on the stock per tonne of catch, if more spawning potential is lost 
in the larger number of small fish needed to make up a tonne than in a 
smaller number of large fish.  The issue has been raised at CCSBT 
meetings in two contexts. 
The first context is the relatively greater impact on stock per tonne of 
catch of small fish.  Composed of immature fish, Australia’s large 
surface fishery catches did not immediately affect the parental biomass, 
as it took several years for the removal of young fish to be reflected as 
reduced survival to maturity.  Conversely, the benefit of a surface fishery 
catch restriction would not have been observed as an improvement in 
parental biomass for several years.  In contrast, because the longline 
fishery catch (which comprised predominantly adult SBT) had an 
immediate impact on parental biomass, reducing longline catches would 
have reduced in severity or prevented the further decline in parental 
biomass.  The mid-1980s trilateral scientific reports showed that 1 tonne 
of surface fishery catch had at that time roughly the same impact on 
parental biomass as 2.25 tonnes of longline catch because of the far 
greater number of fish per tonne of surface catch.161 
                                                                                                                                  
“Recommendation by ICCAT to Amend the Recommendation on Bluefin Tuna 
Farming.”  See ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra note 51, at 160-63.  
 158. ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra note 102, at 235-36, ¶¶ 4.4-4.8.  See also 
ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 184.   
 159. ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra note 119, at 185.   
 160. For example ICCAT has had a series of minimum size limits for ABT.  See 
ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, at 123, ¶ 7. 
 161. CATON ET AL., supra note 78, at 28.  The ratio of 2.25:1 is consistent with the 
slope of the dotted line in Figure 1 in TRILATERAL SCIENTIFIC REPORTS COMPENDIUM, 
supra note 58, at 30.  The scientists’ equation in the two previous years of the effect on 
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The second context calls into question the continued desirability of 
discriminating by size at all when catch is limited by tonnage.  In 1996, 
Japan announced at the Third Meeting of the CCSBT that its industry 
had adopted a policy of returning to the sea fish of less than 25 kg alive 
at the time of retrieval.162  In response to an Australian query, Japan 
advised that it assumed a survival rate of 55% of the returned fish and 
counted the 45% mortality against its quota.163  This accounted for 711 
tonnes of its declared catch for 1995 of 5866 tonnes, the mean weight of 
non-retained fish being 20.1 kg.164  Australia questioned the assumption, 
noting that in the Scientific Committee a quite different rate had been 
suggested by Japan.165  New Zealand called for the CCSBT to develop a 
uniform policy on non-retention of fish.166  It did not, but rather merely 
called on its members to encourage consistent observation by their fleets 
of whatever policy each might adopt.167  At the CCSBT’s Fourth 
Meeting, Japan announced that from 1997 the policy of releasing small 
SBT no longer applied.168  
It may be noted that, if there were a positive requirement to debit 
against quota all fish taken on board a vessel regardless of their 
subsequent fate, there could be no objection on conservation grounds to 
the superimposition of a policy of returning smaller fish to the sea if still 
alive (although the difficulty of enforcement possibly explains why this 
is not done).  It would depend on the balance of desirability between 
limitation of absolute catch by weight and influencing the size 
composition of the catch.  The pendulum may be expected to swing back 
and forth from time to time, depending on the state of the stock. 
A second reason for discarding fish subject to quota is that the 
operator catching them may have taken them as bycatch, but lack quota 
to cover them.  At the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000, Japan, 
armed with Australian press clippings, raised allegations over the 
discarding of 250 to 400 tonnes of SBT by Australian east coast 
                                                                                                                                  
the parental biomass of surface catch of 11,000 tonnes and 26,000 tonnes of longline 
catch given the 1981 age composition of the stock, with 14,500 tonnes each of surface 
and longline catch, id. at 15, implies a ratio of roughly 3.3:1, and subsequently of 13,500 
tonnes of surface catch and 27,000 tonnes of longline catch with 18,000 tonnes each of 
surface and longline catch of 2:1, id. at 20.  
 162. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, Attachment G, ¶ 1(3).   
 163. CCSBT3(1) Report, supra note 64, at 9-10.   
 164. Id. at 10.   
 165. Id.   
 166. Id.    
 167. Id. at 28. 
 168. CCSBT4(1) Report, supra note 65, at 5. 
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longliners for lack of quota and asked how catch discarded in this way 
was treated under Australia’s quota management regime; in particular, 
whether and how it was debited against quota.169  Not replying directly, 
Australia stated that it was prepared to prosecute offenders given 
sufficient evidence, but pointed out the economic motives of those 
making the allegations and added that there had always been SBT taken 
on the east coast, with Australian quota remaining available to cover 
these catches.170 
The question was pursued further when the meeting resumed for a 
second session some months later.  Australia now clarified that those 
likely to catch SBT along the east coast were free to purchase or lease 
quota.171  Implicitly admitting that there was substance to Japan’s 
allegations, Australia advised that it would nonetheless introduce a 
system of rolling closures following the progression of migrating SBT 
along the east coast, from May through September.172  Henceforth, only 
those with 500 kg or more of quota could operate in the closed area, with 
the location and movement of vessels monitored through the requirement 
that each carry an approved satellite-based monitoring system.173  At the 
CCSBT’s Seventh Meeting, Australia declared a catch in the 2000 
season of 5257 tonnes, just 8 tonnes under its voluntary limit, of which 
114 tonnes were caught off New South Wales and Tasmania by 37 
longliners that operated off New South Wales between May and 
November of that year, with closure of waters south of Sydney between 
June and August to those lacking sufficient quota.174  In the following 
year, Australia advised that in the 2001 season it had introduced an 
                                                          
 169. CCSBT, Report for the Sixth Annual Meeting, First Part, at 5, ¶ 33 (1999) 
available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_6/report_of_ccsbt6_ 
Part1.pdf  [hereinafter CCSBT6(1) Report].  See also id. Attachment C, ¶ 6(3).   
 170. Id. at 5, ¶ 33.  The reference to economic motives is an allusion to the East Coast 
Tuna Boat Owners’ Association Inc., which lobbied for ITQs to be made available free of 
charge to its members whose longliners caught SBT as bycatch, despite the fact that they 
had previously held such quota but sold it to South Australian operators.  The New South 
Wales longline catch was 475 tonnes in 1998, only 97 tonnes in 1999 when the 
allegations were raised, then 114 tonnes in 2000, 60 tonnes in 2001 and 22 tonnes in 2002 
(these figures include, for data confidentiality reasons, various combinations of 
Queensland and Tasmanian longline catch and New South Wales pole-and-line catch in 
successive seasons, as data from groups of less than five boats may not be released).  
CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1 at 1, 4, Table 1. 
 171. CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 9, ¶ 54.   
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 54.   
 174. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-1, ¶¶ 1-7. 
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ongoing audit of fishing records,175 and added in 2003 that access to the 
waters off Western Australia through which SBT migrate had also been 
restricted in the same way since 2001.176 
Australia’s most recent annual report to the CCSBT, which states 
that since 2004 the restricted access zone has been divided into a core 
zone and a buffer zone, indicates that there is still a problem.  Since 
2005, operators with less than 500 kg of quota have again been allowed 
into both zones between May and October, but only with 100% observer 
coverage.177  In the buffer zone, those with more than 500 kg of quota are 
required to have 25% observer coverage.178  In the core zone, 100% 
coverage is required for those with less than 2 tonnes of quota, 75% for 
those with between 2 and 5 tonnes, 50% for those with between 5 and 10 
tonnes, 25% up to 20 tonnes, and 10% coverage above that figure.179 
In the longer term, bycatch by members must be distinguished from 
bycatch by vessels of non-member States, most of which remain outside 
the commission precisely because their fishing fleets have no interest in 
the SBT fishery.  The easiest way to avoid adverse legal consequences 
from any genuinely inadvertent catch of SBT is to dump the fish 
overboard.  If the aim is to minimize mortality, it is immaterial whether 
fish that are already dead are dumped at sea or landed.  Since, however, 
verifiable scientific information is gained only if they are landed, this is 
an argument for using the UNCLOS Article 118 duty of cooperation to 
discourage dumping,180 through treating bycatch leniently, despite the 
risk of creating a perverse incentive to misreport as bycatch fish that are 
deliberately taken.181 
                                                          
 175. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-1 at 3, ¶ 7. 
 176. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-1 at 3, ¶ 7.   
 177. P.I. Hobsbawn et al., Australia’s Annual Review of the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Fishery, in CCSBT-EC6, supra note 104, Attachment 8-1, ¶ 4. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Referring to anadromous species, William T. Burke concludes that UNCLOS 
Article 66 applies to both directed fishing and bycatch, arguing that “[i]f a significant 
portion of the catch is beyond regulatory control, the coastal state either cannot act to take 
adequate conservation measures or can only take ineffective measures.” See WILLIAM T. 
BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND 140 
(Oxford University Press 1994). 
 181. Australian legislation requires quota for all landed species subject to quota, but 
policy allows quota to be purchased or leased by the 15th day of the following month to 
cover over-quota landings of bycatch species. G. Geen, W. Nielander & T.F. Meany, 
Australian Experience with Individual Transferable Quota Systems, in ORGANIZATION 
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USE OF INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 84 (OECD 1993) [hereinafter Geen et al.].  The same authors 
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The practice in some of ICCAT’s fisheries of tolerating small 
catches of species under quota up to a given limit—for instance 200 
tonnes of northern albacore tuna182—may be of assistance in this regard.  
For instance, suppose catch of less than ten tonnes of SBT were deemed 
by CCSBT as bycatch not warranting the imposition of any trade 
measures under the Action Plan.  Such a policy would be aimed at the 
operations of non-members and vessels whose actions undermine the 
CCSBT’s management arrangements, so as to encourage them to join the 
Commission or cooperate with its arrangements.183  Since the number of 
States and fishing entities at any given time is finite, a rule of this kind at 
ten tonnes for each would equate to a tolerance limit of catch by non-
members under this head of around 1900 tonnes in theory, but a great 
deal less in practice if the limits are non-transferable.  By contrast, a 
system of trading in quota might be needed for catch over the 
threshold.184   In order to avoid the Action Plan measures, the non-
member would be required to purchase quota from a member to cover its 
whole catch, which could only be done by acceding to the 1993 
Convention or becoming a cooperating non-member if the trading 
scheme were confined to these.  For those within the system, the best 
policy may be to estimate bycatch mortality for building into TAC 
calculations.185 
                                                                                                                                  
advocate use of a deemed value or surrender price method to discourage dumping of 
bycatch species without inadvertently encouraging their targeting.  Id. at 85.  See also 
Roger Falloon & T.M. Berthold, Individual Transferable Quotas The New Zealand Case, 
in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE USE OF 
INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 57-58 (OECD 1993).  But these do not 
appear easily replicated on the international plane. 
 182. ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra note 119, Annex 4.3, app. 3 at 123, ¶ 2.  Faced 
with a problem of discarding in the Northern Atlantic swordfish fishery, ICCAT designed 
its rebuilding plan for the stock on the basis that it “must account for all sources of 
fishing mortality.”  ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 1998-99 Part II (1999), Vol. 1, 
Annex 5.2 at 69 (2000) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2000/1], available at  
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_98-99_II_1.pdf.  Note the part 
played in this by carry-forward of unders and overs.  Id. at 71, ¶¶ 4, 5. 
 183. CCSBT6(2) Report, supra note 68, at 3, ¶ 14.  The text of the Action Plan forms 
Attachment I to the Report. 
 184. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 185. Steven Cunningham, Outcome of the Workshop on Individual Quota 
Management, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE 
USE OF INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 13 (OECD 1993). 
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F. Other Non-Commercial Catch 
The nearer quota comes to being perceived as a tradable asset, the 
more interest members will have in ensuring that all sources of catch are 
accounted for, since it would be more obvious than under the traditional 
national allocation system that any perceived gain by one member of an 
unfair advantage comes at the other members’ expense.  Bycatch is the 
most obvious potential source of friction in this regard, but other forms 
of non-commercial catch are recreational, indigenous, and scientific 
catch.  There may be some overlap among the categories.186 
Recreational fishing limits typically impose a bag limit per person 
per day of a small number of fish.  Since there is generally no limit to the 
number of persons engaging in recreational fishing, or on how many 
days per year they may fish, it follows that there is no effective upper 
limit to the total recreational catch in any jurisdiction.  Such limits apply 
to SBT in most Australian States187 and South Africa,188 but not New 
Zealand. 
                                                          
 186. At the 2004 CCSBT meeting, Australia advised that discussions were underway 
with its game fish association for all recreationally caught SBT to be tagged and released, 
with the release data to be provided to the CCSBT.  Since the research tagging was 
opportunistic rather than a planned experiment, no research mortality allowance was 
made available to cover it; instead, any associated mortality would count against 
Australia’s national allocation.  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 11-12, ¶¶ 78, 79.  
 187. In New South Wales, there is a combined possession limit of two tuna (albacore, 
bigeye, longtail, SBT, or yellowfin) 90 cm in length or more, and five of the same species 
smaller than 90 cm.  New South Wales Department of Primary Industries, Fishing and 
Aquaculture, Bag and Size Limits – Saltwater, www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/ 
recreational/regulations/sw/sw-bag-and-size#Finfish-Bag-and-Size-limits (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2009).  South Australia has a combined SBT and yellowfin tuna limit of two per 
person and six per boat.  Government of South Australia, Primary Industries and 
Resources, Catch Limits & Legal Lengths, www.pir.sa.gov.au/fisheries/ 
recreational_fishing/catch_limits_and_legal_lengths (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).  
Tasmania has a “combined possession limit” per person of two SBT, yellowfin, and 
bigeye tuna. Tasmania Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment, 
Bag and Possession Limits, www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/HMUY-5TA4EU?open 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009).  Victoria’s limit is two per person.  Victoria Department of Primary 
Industries, New Recreational Catch Limits from 2009, http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/DPI/ 
nrenfaq.nsf/LinkView/D158413C52C3F077CA25755300158AEC863080215E41289ECA257
53D0013A569/$file/Fact%20sheet%20-%20New%20recreational%20Fisheries%20Regulations 
%20from%202%20March%202009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).  Western Australia is 
divided into four regions for recreational fishing purposes, but in all four there is a combined 
daily bag limit per angler of two SBT, bigeye, and yellowfin tuna. Government of Western 
Australia, South Coast Bag and Size Limits, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/SouthLimits/ 
SouthCoastRules_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of Western Australia, 
Recreational Fishing Guide – West Coast Region, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/ 
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Recreational catch has become an issue within the CCSBT.  
Australia reported in 2002 that it was discussing the matter with State 
Governments, but in any event was far enough short of its national 
allocation to accommodate any recreational catch of SBT.189  This must 
be doubted if the high recreational catch of eighty-five tonnes for that 
year, a figure estimated by the New South Wales Government,190 is to be 
believed.  Australia’s feeble response to the questions posed to it at the 
2007 meeting do not make its position any more credible, though this 
may change if it carries out its intention to provide a report to the 
CCSBT on the management of its recreational fishery.191  New Zealand 
reported in 2003 that recreational fishing for SBT was limited, though 
historical catches before records began may have been higher.192  It 
advised that it had reserved four tonnes of its national allocation to cover 
recreational catch, which it considered sufficient for its recreational 
fishery.193 
Since the resolution of the 1998-2001 dispute over Japan’s unilateral 
experimental fishing, the CCSBT has also developed a history of 
allocating modest tonnages for scientific catches that do not count 
against national allocations.  There is precedent for this in ICCAT, which 
has exempted participants’ catches of up to fifteen tonnes of ABT from 
                                                                                                                                  
WestLimits/westcoast_rules_2008.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of Western 
Australia, Recreational Fishing Guide – Gascoyne Region, http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/ 
pub/GascoyneLimits/gascoyne_rules2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Government of 
Western Australia, Recreational Fishing Guide – North Coast Region, 
http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/NorthLimits/NorthernCoastRules_2009.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2009).  No limit appears to apply in Queensland. 
 188. In 1994, the recreational catch limit in South Africa was reported to be ten of any 
tuna species per person per day.  A.J. Penney, National Report of South Africa, in 
ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 1994-95 Part I (1994), Vol. 1,  259, ¶ 3 (1995),  
available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_94-95_I_1.pdf.  It was 
unchanged in 2003, with the same size limits in the Marine Living Resources Act 1998 
also applying to the recreational sector.  ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period 2002-03 
Part II (2003), Vol.3, 87, ¶ 3.2 (2004) [hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/3], available 
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_3.pdf.. 
 189. CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra note 105, at 5, 11, ¶¶ 35, 75.   
 190. P.I. Hobsbawn et al., Australia’s Annual Review of the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Fishery, in CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, Attachment 12-1, ¶ 4, Table 6. 
 191. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 9, 20-21, ¶¶ 53, 108-112. 
 192. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶ 3.  The indigenous non-
commercial catch was also counted against New Zealand’s national allocation.  See 
CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 8-4, ¶¶ 2, 5. 
 193. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 12, ¶ 80. 
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otherwise applicable conservation measures.194  For the various 
components of the Scientific Research Program, the members and the 
Secretariat from 2001 onwards requested, and the CCSBT approved, the 
following mortality allowances: for tagging programs, sixty-five tonnes 
in 2002 and forty tonnes in 2003; for other research by Japan, 3.6 tonnes 
in 2001 and 6.5 tonnes in 2002; and, for a series of spawning ground and 
acoustic surveys, ten tonnes in 2003.195  Research mortalities of forty-
seven tonnes were approved in 2004 for an acoustic survey (one tonne) 
and various tagging projects (forty-six tonnes); the like total for 2005 
was fifty-one tonnes, and in 2006 it was twenty-two tonnes.196  In 2007, 
Australia sought ten tonnes to cover the expected mortality of 7.5 tonnes 
in an experiment on stereo video recording of transfer of SBT into farm 
cages, but the meeting report does not reveal whether this or any other 
research allowance was granted to any member.197 
ICCAT, too, has dealt on several occasions with non-commercial 
catch.  For example, in 1999, it passed an across-the-board resolution on 
recreational fishery statistics and in 2006 it created a Working Group on 
Sport and Recreational Fisheries.198 
                                                          
 194. See  ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra note 102, at 141, ¶ 3.  This policy has 
continued since, and with a further fifteen tonnes of other tunas.  ICCAT, Report for 
Biennial Period 2000-01 Part II (2001), Vol. 1, Annex 9-8, at 222, ¶ 3 (2002), available 
at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf. 
 195. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶¶ 13, 54, 95, 97; CCSBT-EC1 Report, 
supra note 105, at 15, ¶¶ 97-100.  See also CCSBT, Report of the Extended Scientific 
Committee for the Eighth Meeting of the Scientific Committee at 19, ¶ 106 (Sept. 1-4, 
2003), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_10/ 
report_of_sc8.pdf; CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 13, ¶¶ 70-71.  Not all the 
allowances were caught: in 2002 only 0.8 tonnes had been used for the Japanese 
spawning ground survey and 13.28 tonnes for tagging programs.  Id. ¶ 69. 
 196. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 12-13, ¶¶ 87-89; CCSBT-EC4 Report, 
supra note 64, at ¶ 124; CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 18, ¶ 103.  See also 
CCSBT, Eleventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee, at 24-25, ¶¶ 133-136 (2006), 
available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_ 
SC11.pdf. 
 197. CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra note 104, at 16, ¶ 93. 
 198. ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, at 78.  See also ICCAT Green Book 
2007/1, supra note 9, at 175. 
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G. Misalignment of Fishing Seasons 
The staggered fishing seasons of CCSBT members199 have caused 
few problems to date, but this may change if a formal management 
procedure—in other words, a formulaic rule for deriving automatic 
adjustments to the TAC and national allocations from new scientific 
information—is adopted.  This troubled participants at an early workshop 
meeting called to devise such a rule, who noted that any TAC change 
required by a given management procedure would most likely apply to 
quota years and therefore be implemented at slightly different times by 
different members.200  As the CCSBT's annual meeting, where the 
relevant decision would be made, has in recent years normally taken 
place in October, 201 this would make it impossible for a member whose 
quota year starts any earlier to implement the change for up to twelve 
months.  This, in turn, would create a time lag of two years between the 
year in which the date on which the management procedure relies are 
generated and the implementation of any consequential TAC change.  
The CCSBT would therefore need to discuss and specify the quota year 
in which a TAC change arising from the management procedure would 
be implemented for each member.202   
                                                          
 199. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop, 
Attachment 6 (May 16-21, 2005) [hereinafter CCSBT-MPW4 Report], available at 
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_MPWS4.pdf (listing the 
quota years).  Only Taiwan and the Philippines use the calendar year, whereas Australia’s 
quota year runs from Dec. 1 to the following Nov. 30, Japan’s and Korea’s run from 
March 1 to the end of the following February, and New Zealand’s runs from Oct. 1 to the 
following Sept. 30.  Id.   
 200. CCSBT, Report of the Second Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop, 
Attachment E, app. 6 at 26 [hereinafter CCBST-MPW2 Report], available at 
www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_10/report_of_mpws2.pdf. 
 201. Article 6(3) of the 1993 Convention actually names August as the default month 
for annual meetings, suggesting a tacit understanding among its drafters that the national 
allocations apply to the next fishing season of each member, whenever it may start.   
 202. CCBST-MPW2 Report, supra note 200, Attachment E, app. 6.  Note that the 
staggering of fishing seasons could also complicate any superimposition of quota trading.  
To avoid conservation consequences at the margin, it would seem that any system in 
which the members are left to their own devices in transferring quota to each other would 
either need to align members’ fishing seasons or, in the alternative, introduce a restriction 
that transfers can only take place from a relinquishing member to a gaining member 
whose season ends at the same time as, or later than, that of the relinquishing member.  
Such a restriction seems undesirable because over time it would result in trading pushing 
allocations artificially from members with early-starting fishing seasons to those whose 
seasons finish later, even though the timing of season dates is in this context essentially 
an arbitrary factor.  In the CCSBT, for example, it would mean that New Zealand (whose 
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Any alignment of seasons will also require compensating allocations 
or deductions for the longer or shorter transitional season.  Depending on 
the pattern of catch through the year, it may not necessarily be 
appropriate to equate a one-month adjustment with one twelfth of either 
the previous national allocation, or the new one, if changed.  This 
complication could be avoided, however, by making the alignment in a 
year when the TAC does not change.203  While there can be no objection 
on conservation grounds to extending the duration of a season longer 
than twelve months, shortening of the season can lead to abuse if it 
occurs in a situation where the full quota has been taken in less than 365 
days and the early closure leads to a new season opening the next day 
with a fresh quota.204  Australia has had two SBT seasons of thirteen 
months or more and one season of eleven-and-a-half months.  The short 
season was preceded two years earlier by a thirteen-and-a-half-month 
one, however, so that the three seasons together lasted thirty-seven 
months; this may explain why no other member objected to it.205 
H. Control of Fishing by Nationals 
Because at international law States’ jurisdiction over their nationals 
applies equally to natural and legal persons and vessels, the fact that 
some nationals of fishery commission member States use vessels flagged 
to non-members creates a further perception of unfair advantage.  Here 
                                                                                                                                  
season starts and finishes earlier than any other member’s) could never purchase quota, 
only sell it.  The scientists developing the CCSBT’s management procedure seem to have 
come to a similar conclusion for automatic adjustments under the procedure in the TAC 
and national allocations (pari passu or not). CCSBT-MPW4 Report, supra note 199, at 
24, ¶ 100.   
 203. On the other hand, a State that wished to make a one-off contribution to the 
biomass without jeopardizing its initial share could elect to forgo compensation for a 
transitional year longer than twelve months.  Human psychology being what it is, 
members whose seasons start early could help make the process easier by not objecting to 
a late starting date for the new uniform season that will avoid any member having a 
transitional season of less than 12 months.  
 204. For an egregious example of this in the groundfish fishery on the Atlantic coast of 
the United States in the 1970s, see J.L. McHugh, The Jeffersonian Democracy and 
Fisheries Revisited, in GLOBAL FISHERIES: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980S 73, 89 (B.J. 
Rothschild ed., Springer-Verlag 1983). 
 205. Australia’s SBT fishing years ran from Oct. 1 to the following Sept. 30 in 1988-
90; Oct. 1, 1991, to Oct. 31, 1992; Nov. 1 to the following Oct. 31 in 1992 and 1993; 
Nov. 1, 1994, to Dec. 15, 1995; Dec. 16, 1995, to Dec. 15, 1996; Dec. 16, 1996, to Nov. 
30, 1997; and since 1997 from Dec. 1 to the following Nov. 30.  CCBST-EC6 Report, 
supra note 104, Attachment 8-1, app. 1, at 15. 
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again, the experience of the CCSBT is instructive.  In 1998, New 
Zealand raised reports that Japanese interests had chartered bunkering 
vessels that were also used by fishing vessels flagged to non-members of 
the CCSBT, that Japan provided a market for non-member catch, and 
that there was considerable investment by Japanese interests in non-
member SBT fishing operations.206  New Zealand advised that it had 
procedures in place to prevent New Zealand interests from entering into 
charter or joint fishing arrangements for SBT with non-members, but 
was not aware of any bunkering of non-member vessels fishing for SBT 
or any investment by New Zealand nationals in non-member SBT fishing 
operations.207  Australia, too, stated that it had similar restrictions 
preventing joint ventures with, and access to its ports by, vessels from 
States fishing for SBT outside the 1993 Convention regime.208  Japan 
admitted that its nationals were working as crew on non-member vessels 
and had issued a non-binding directive (which for constitutional reasons 
could not be binding) advising them to cease this practice.209  Japan 
confirmed that it maintained no restrictions on the import of SBT and 
that it had a system for regulating investment by Japanese in non-
member SBT fishing operations.210   
In recent years, the focus of attention has shifted to catch of SBT 
taken in Indonesian waters by vessels owned by Taiwanese interests but 
flagged to Indonesia, allowing Taiwan to maintain that their catch should 
be considered Indonesian.  This came about as a result of the Trade 
Information Scheme adopted by the CCSBT at its Sixth Meeting in 1999, 
set to come into operation on June 1, 2000,211 which highlighted a link 
between Indonesian and Taiwanese fishing through the recording of over 
1800 tonnes of SBT imports into Japan from Taiwan despite Taiwan’s 
                                                          
 206. CCSBT, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting at 2 (Jan. 19-22, 1998), available 
at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_4/report_of_ccsbt4_part2.pdf. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. CCSBT6(1) Report, supra note 169, at 3, ¶ 18.  The full details of the scheme are 
set out in “CCSBT Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program” (Attachment 
M to the report), but some of the text is square-bracketed, indicating that the points 
concerned were left by the members to subsequent negotiation.  When the meeting 
resumed some months later, the Executive Secretary advised that, since the adjournment, 
the details of the scheme had been sent to those non-members identified by Japan as 
having exported SBT to it within the last five years as well as to other international 
fishery commissions.  A finalized version of the scheme was then adopted.  CCSBT6(2) 
Report, supra note 68, at 4, ¶ 21. The full specification of the scheme is in “CCSBT 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program” (Attachment J to the report). 
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voluntary restraint of its catch to 1450 tonnes.  Taiwan appears to have 
initially accepted responsibility for the catch of Taiwan-owned vessels 
fishing in Indonesian waters in declaring (despite its policy of restricting 
its catch to 1450 tonnes) catches for 1999 and 2000 of 1787 tonnes and 
1689 tonnes, respectively,212 before reclassifying them as unregulated 
Indonesian catch the following year.213  The meeting repeated the 
previous year’s concern that Taiwanese vessels were catching SBT under 
flags of convenience and at Taiwan’s “apparent inability to exert any 
control over these vessels, or to provide information concerning the 
number of vessels, or the flags that they flew.”214  Japan urged Taiwan to 
follow its example by making it illegal for its citizens to target SBT 
using a flag-of-convenience vessel.215 
Taiwanese vessels fishing in Indonesian waters would have been 
unproblematic had Indonesia by then—rather than in 2008—become a 
member and had the Taiwanese vessels in fact been fishing against 
Indonesian quota.  As it was, Taiwan had both the power and the duty to 
control this catch, considering that, through Taiwan’s membership in the 
Extended Commission, it had given a “firm commitment to respect” 
Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention.216  Although the 
beneficial ownership of fishing vessels is often deliberately kept obscure, 
ideally all catch of SBT by vessels owned or controlled by nationals of 
CCSBT members should be brought into their mutual accounting.  
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CCSBT’S STOCK STATUS 
TARGET AND THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD STANDARD IN 
UNCLOS 
State responsibility also has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the 
members of a fisheries commission do not collectively abandon their 
                                                          
 212. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment F-5, at 1. 
 213. The 1999 and 2000 catches have been reduced to 1513 and 1638 tonnes, 
respectively.  CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, Attachment K-5, at 1.  Taiwan agreed to 
investigate this catch further, and at the following (Eighth) Meeting of the CCSBT 
Taiwan advised that the vessels operating in Indonesian waters were in fact flagged to 
Indonesia; hence Taiwan considered their catch as Indonesian.  See CCSBT7 Report, 
supra note 105, ¶¶ 33-36.  See also CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 6, ¶ 39.  The SBT 
catches by the Philippines and the Seychelles detected by the scheme were also thought 
to be by Taiwanese-owned vessels operating under flags of convenience.  Id. ¶ 90, at 13.  
See also ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, at 133.   
 214. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 13, ¶ 91.   
 215. Id.   
 216. CCSBT7 Report, supra note 105, Attachment I, ¶ 6. 
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conservation obligations, not to each other (for voluntary abandonment 
inter se would seem to be legally unobjectionable), but to other States 
potentially interested in entering the fishery in the future.  The CCSBT, 
however, is in danger of doing just that, as a consequence of its special 
meeting in 2004, at which all members agreed that the former 
management objective of restoring the parental stock to its 1980 biomass 
(B1980) by 2020 was not feasible.   
It should be noted that the abandoned B1980 by 2020 objective was 
not set with reference to Bmsy; the 1980 level was simply one that, up to 
then, seemed high enough to avoid any adverse effect on recruitment.217  
Hence, even if this goal had been met, it would not be safe to say that 
there would be no need to rebuild the stock any further.218  Nor would the 
CCSBT thereby have satisfied the target set in 2002 at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development: that action was required to “[m]aintain or 
restore stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield 
with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent 
basis and where possible not later than 2015.”219  It is now all but 
inevitable that members will have the uncomfortable task of explaining 
to a future such gathering why this was not possible for SBT. 
Even before its abandonment, however, there was no concerted effort 
to meet the goal.  The Chair of the Scientific Committee advised the 
Eighth Meeting of the CCSBT that the 2000 catch level of 15,579 tonnes 
appeared to be “roughly close to the replacement yield, with a 50% 
chance that the stock could either decrease or increase at this harvest 
level.”220  While no effort had yet been made to estimate the harvest level 
                                                          
 217. Transcript of Record, Public Sitting of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea at 16, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan) 
ITLOS/PV.99/22/Rev.2 (Aug. 19, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/ 
case_documents/2001/document_en_141.pdf. 
 218. This is comparable to the use by the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea, from which the European Community obtains its fisheries science advice, of 
impaired recruitment as a limit (danger) reference point, which is perceived as less 
precautionary than NAFO’s use of MSY.  O.S. Stokke & C. Coffey, Precaution, ICES 
and the Common Fisheries Policy: A Study of Regime Interplay, 28 MARINE POLICY 117, 
120 (2004).  On the adoption of MSY in NAFO, see S.M. Garcia, The Precautionary 
Approach to Fisheries: Progress Review and Main Issues (1995-2000), in CURRENT 
FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 479, 493-95 (M.H. Nordquist & J. Norton Moore eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2000).  
 219. World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD], Johannesburg, South 
Africa, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Annex at ¶ 31(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002) [hereinafter WSSD Plan of 
Implementation]. 
 220. CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, at 7, ¶ 43.  
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required to achieve recovery of the parental stock to its 1980 level by 
2020, most of the assessment results indicated low probability of 
attaining this target at that catch level.221  Yet New Zealand found no 
support when it stated, in reasoning that cannot be faulted, that “[t]he 
logical and responsible conclusion we draw from this is that catch levels 
must be reduced in order to achieve our stated management 
objectives.”222 
Modeling was carried out some years ago to estimate the likelihood 
of returning the SBT stock to Bmsy by 2020 under a number of 
management strategies if removals were reduced in the short term.  The 
significance of these is that the more successful models show average 
removals over the period to 2020 exceeding present removals, suggesting 
that the MSY itself would be over 20,000 tonnes per annum.223  For the 
CCSBT to adopt a management strategy that delays or prevents recovery 
of the stock to Bmsy is therefore, it is submitted, to deny all potential new 
entrants’ rights to share in the benefit that such a recovery would bring.   
This, however, is precisely what it seems to be doing, judging from 
the debate on the management strategy in 2003 and 2004.  When it 
began, only New Zealand said that any alternative objective to B1980 by 
2020 must be consistent with the 1993 Convention and the wider 
international legal regime, and even it qualified this, stating that until 
there was an agreed management procedure to guide members toward the 
new objective, the current one should stay.224  Because of the state of the 
stock, it preferred a cautious procedure over an aggressive policy, but 
viewed TAC changes every three years as suitable.225  Australia 
considered that the current objective should be replaced by an achievable 
one that resulted in “some rebuilding” of the stock––this could, but need 
not, be Bmsy.226  Taiwan, too, believed that the current objective could not 
be reached and agreed in principle to its revision, but did not say how 
beyond favoring gradual changes in TAC at five-year intervals.227  Japan 
considered that the current “very strict” objective was not achievable, 
and that Bmsy would be more appropriate, but the period for achieving it 
                                                          
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at Attachment N-4. 
 223. T. Polacheck, N.L. Klaer, C. Millar & A.L. Preece, An Initial Evaluation of 
Management Strategies for the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery,  56 ICES JOURNAL OF 
MARINE SCIENCE 811, 819 (1999).  Care should be taken, however, as this assumes the 
catch statistics on which the modellers relied were accurate.   Id. at 816.   
 224. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 4-4 at 2-3.  See also id. at 8, ¶ 46.   
 225. Id. at 7, ¶ 46. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. 
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could be decided “once more data become available.”228  Japan also 
wanted to “explore more moderate policies” with biomass at 100% and 
110% of the much smaller 2002 level.229  Korea, “from an administrative 
perspective,” said it would be best for the fishery to be highly productive 
and managed with an aggressive catch policy “so that a future increase in 
stock, if any, would be retained by members, without giving an incentive 
to non-members.”230   
At the 2004 Special Meeting, Australia and New Zealand both 
required an objective that would result in rebuilding of the stock—
already an essential component of the then current management 
objective—but New Zealand was alone in drawing attention to how 
members’ wider international obligations might constrain their choice of 
a new one.231  Taiwan preferred only gradual TAC reductions in the short 
term and would have been satisfied with a management objective of a 
spawning stock biomass only 90% of that in 2002 (B2002).232  Japan 
wanted an objective based on Bmsy, while Korea could support either Bmsy 
or B2002 as the objective.233  The management procedure ultimately 
adopted aims at a probability of 50% that the parental biomass in 2014 
will be smaller than that of 2004, which was its lowest yet recorded, and 
a 10% chance that by 2022 this biomass will be below that of 2004.234  
                                                          
 228. Id.  Note that if Japan is saying that Bmsy by 2020 would be less strict than B1980 
by 2020, there is a contradiction in its position unless either B1980 is greater than Bmsy 
or Japan was not advocating reaching Bmsy until long after 2020; the former is very 
unlikely. 
 229. Id.   
 230. Id. at 8, ¶ 46.  The Korean attitude is a straightforward manifestation of the 
disastrous but rational reasoning engendered under the “tragedy of the commons” 
affecting high seas fisheries; with open access, all players have an incentive to maximize 
their own catch irrespective of the damage they do to the stock (and of their knowledge of 
that damage) because, as H.S. Gordon put it in his pioneering article on fisheries 
economics, “the fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no 
assurance that they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind today.”  H.S. 
Gordon, Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 124, 135 (1954). 
 231. CCSBT, Report of the Special Meeting of the Extended Commission at 4, ¶ 13 
(2004) [hereinafter CCSBTSM4 Report], available at www.ccsbt.org/ 
docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/report_of_special_meeting.pdf.  See also id., 
Attachment 4-4 at 2 (detailing the argument by New Zealand that any objective that does 
not rebuild the stock “would be contrary to the [1993] Convention and our international 
obligations,” although there was “flexibility around the timeframe for achieving 
rebuilding”). 
 232. Id. at 5, ¶ 13. 
 233. Id. 
 234. CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra note 87, at 8, ¶¶ 37-38, 9, ¶ 45. 
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The proposed upper and lower bounds of parental biomass in 2022 of 1.5 
and 0.7 times B2002 were accepted, although a lower bound of 0.8 or 0.9 
might be preferred, and emphasis was laid on exploring procedures 
around the “moderate level” of 1.1 as a coefficient (that is, aiming for the 
stock in 2022 to be only 10% larger than its depleted state of 2002).235  In 
settling on these parameters, members appear to have been taking their 
cue from the views of industry representatives consulted during the 
CCSBT’s development of a management procedure, some preferring to 
aim to rebuild the stock to its 2002 level, others favoring merely 
arresting its decline, but none calling for rebuilding to Bmsy.236  
In other words, even if the catch figures that the CCSBT had been 
using up to 2006 had been accurate and the 2004 management procedure 
had been fully implemented, it is not clear when, if ever, the stock would 
have been rebuilt to Bmsy, as Article 5 of Annex II to the U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement and (subject to economic and environmental factors) Article 
119, paragraph 1(a) of UNCLOS both require. 
This should not be surprising; the economics of fishing produce a 
paradigm shift when the Bmsy barrier is breached, so that operators will 
resist the injunction to restrict catches in order to rebuild the stock to 
Bmsy from below.  An example of the trouble this causes is an unreported 
judgment of the New Zealand High Court in a case where evidence had 
been led that in the New Zealand snapper fishery a yield of 92% of MSY 
was being produced by a biomass that was only 50% of Bmsy.  The Court 
held that the Minister of Fisheries had discretion as to the pace at which 
to rebuild to Bmsy, but not about whether to do so at all.237  While Burke’s 
criticism that this will lead to greater risk of depletion is hard to 
understand, the case does illustrate the economic point that a fishery in 
this position would need a substantial drop from the current level of 
catch in order to rebuild the stock to Bmsy, but participants would not be 
rewarded by much more catch in the future.  Even a low discount rate 
might not justify this in cost-benefit terms, though a reduction in 
unnecessary effort might.  The discount rate of SBT, however, is very 
high.  This is illustrated by the aborted CCSBT management procedure: 
in 2005, a cut in the TAC for 2006 of 5000 tonnes (which was to have 
been the first step in a management procedure aimed at reaching a 
particular stock size by 2014) was delayed by a year.  Still wanting to 
                                                          
 235. CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶ 52. 
 236. See CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra note 200, Attachment G, ¶7. 
 237. William T. Burke, Evolution in the Fishery Provisions of UNCLOS, LIBER 
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA Vol. 2 1355, 1356-59 (N. Ando, E. McWhinney & R. 
Wolfrum, eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2002). 
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meet that goal, the members accepted the Scientific Committee’s advice 
that the delayed cut would instead have to be 7160 tonnes.238  In other 
words, 5000 tonnes “borrowed” from the stock for a year and then repaid 
over eight years would result in a total repayment of 8 x (7160 – 5000) = 
17,280 tonnes.239 
The fisheries economics literature predicts as much: if, as is typically 
the case, vessels and labor cannot be immediately redeployed elsewhere, 
the appropriate policy is not to close the depleted fishery altogether––
which would be the quickest way to reach Bmsy––but to rebuild the stock 
gradually.240  Since a stock that is depleted can still be fished sustainably 
(albeit at a yield far below MSY) it can still generate worthwhile 
economic returns.  That it may be more profitable to continue to fish a 
depleted stock at that low yield than to try to rebuild it is evidenced by 
the $A300,000 per tonne being fetched by Australian SBT quota in mid-
2002.241  Because this figure represents the present value of 1/5265th 
share into the indefinite future of whatever catch limit Australian 
authorities impose, anyone willing to pay this price must have thought 
the fishery’s economic prospects bright, all the more so with the lower 
price being fetched on the glutted Japanese market at the time.242 
                                                          
 238. See CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra note 64, ¶¶ 47-66 (discussing TAC). 
 239. Obviously, the total tonnage repaid would be far closer to the 5000 tonnes 
borrowed if the repayment occurred over one or two years, but the very fact that members 
regarded this as worthwhile is a worrying indicator of just how high their implied 
discount rate is (in other words, how much less subjectively valuable for them the 
prospect of a tonne of SBT caught in a year’s or ten years’ time is than a tonne caught 
today), and thus how strong the desire to resist rebuilding the stock to Bmsy—UNCLOS 
Article 119 and Annex II to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement notwithstanding—can be 
expected to remain.  In fact, the implied discount rate, assuming net returns of a fixed 
price per tonne of SBT in 2005 dollars, is no less than 40.326% per annum. See 
MoneyMadeClear Loan Calculator, http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/ 
tools.aspx?Tool=loan_calculator (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (obtaining the result by filling 
in the first, second, and fourth boxes with 5000, 8, and 1, respectively, and manipulating 
the figure in the third (interest rate) box in order for the result displayed in the fifth 
(annual repayment) box to be exactly 2160). 
 240. G.R. Munro & A.D. Scott, The Economics of Fisheries Management, in 
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS, Vol. II, 623, 651 (Allen V. 
Kneese & James L. Sweeney, eds., North-Holland, Amsterdam 1985). 
 241. Andrew Serdy, One Fin, Two Fins, Red Fins, Bluefins: Some Problems of 
Taxonomy and Nomenclature Affecting Legal Instruments Governing Tunas and Other 
Highly Migratory Species, 28 MARINE POLICY 235, 242 n.26 (2004).  
 242. See CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra note 66, Attachment 11 (referring to the “current 
depressed market in Japan”).  Note, though, that there is no reason to think that quota as 
an asset would be less prone to speculative bubbles than, say, shares. 
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Against this economically unpromising backdrop, the precautionary 
approach to fisheries in Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is 
less likely to succeed as a means of reversing depletion than it is in 
preventing it in the first place for stocks not overfished.  Although setting 
Bmsy as the limit reference point serves unexploited and lightly or 
moderately exploited stocks (i.e. those that are above Bmsy) well, left to 
their own devices, as the CCSBT’s attitude shows, those exploiting a 
stock already driven below Bmsy will have insufficient economic 
incentive to rebuild the stock at all, to the detriment of those States that 
could reasonably hope to profit from access to a healthier, rebuilt 
stock.243  From this perspective, it matters little whether Bmsy shifts to 
being a limit reference point under the precautionary approach from its 
role as a target reference point under UNCLOS (in U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement Annex II terms); this will only become relevant after the 
stock has recovered.  Even recovery to Bmsy would be a major advance 
for SBT, so that for the foreseeable future it will be enough for the 
CCSBT to set its management compass by UNCLOS alone.   
Evidently, then, something more is needed to bring the legal and 
economic incentives for depleted stocks into alignment, and it is 
suggested that willingness to invoke State responsibility is the missing 
element.  The news from the biological front is better; the starting point 
here is that, grim though the current state of the SBT stock is, precedents 
from other comparable fisheries indicate that recovery is possible.  
Pacific halibut, for example, is similar in longevity and late maturity to 
SBT,244 yet was brought back from severe depletion: “[a] fishery which 
                                                          
 243. The Western ABT stock is another example of this phenomenon: with the 
spawning stock biomass estimated in 1996 to be 13% of Bmsy, Panel 2 of ICCAT was 
informed that an annual catch of around 2500 tonnes would roughly double it in twenty 
years, but to get to Bmsy in twenty years would require a drastic reduction in catch to 500 
tonnes per annum.  ICCAT Green Book 1997/1, supra note 102, at 112, ¶ 5.b.2.  Despite 
this, Japan proposed raising the TAC to 2500 tonnes from its then current 2200 tonnes, 
id. at 113, ¶ 6.b.3, a course of action adopted first by the panel, id. at 114, ¶ 6.b.17, and 
then by ICCAT itself., id. at 47, ¶13.4.  Although a twenty-year rebuilding program was 
adopted in 1998 (with a twenty-year TAC unless amended), ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, 
supra note 102, at 67, at the first signs of recovery in 2000 Canada and the U.S. wanted 
the TAC held at 2500 tonnes, whereas Japan argued for an increase to 3000 tonnes even 
though only two out of four assessments showed that this was sustainable, ICCAT Green 
Book 2001/1, supra note 102, at 213-15.  In 2007, the TAC had to be reduced to 2100 
tonnes.  ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra note 9, at 144, ¶ 3. 
 244. In this species, individuals older than twenty are common; females mature from 
age eight to sixteen with a mean of twelve and are much more susceptible to overfishing 
than males, which mature between the ages of five and eleven (at nine on average).  H.A. 
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had been disastrously depleted by unrestricted fishing has been so 
restored as to be one of the best stabilized and most profitable to its 
fishermen.”245  Although doubts raised by some on this score246 seem 
vindicated by the subsequent severe shortening of the fishing season and 
economic waste associated with the open access fishery for this species, 
it does not follow that one should deny the recovery was worth bringing 
about, even if it could have been done better.   
On this basis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the members of 
the CCSBT are in collective breach of their conservation obligations 
under customary international law and UNCLOS Article 119 to other 
States that could profitably fish a rebuilt stock at Bmsy.  But the CCSBT is 
surely not unique in this; a similar analysis performed for other stocks 
managed by other commissions would no doubt come to the same 
conclusion for a good number of them, possibly with the eastern Atlantic 
and Mediterranean stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna at the top of the list. 
The international fisheries law community made a bad start in 
implicitly treating quantified catch limits as obligations de conduite.  
This was much less conducive to the success of international fisheries 
management than if they were obligations de résultat, because fish 
caught in excess of a catch limit are lost to the stock even if the 
overcatch is in legal terms excusable.  If this leads to overcatch being 
repeatedly ignored, with no downward adjustments made to future catch 
limits, then the stock will be vulnerable to depletion over time.   
Thus, the question that commissions should ask when faced with 
overcatch is not whether a State has behaved in a way that merits some 
sort of compensatory adjustment being levied against it, but rather 
who—the overcatching State or the members as a whole—should bear 
the loss when one of their number exceeds its quota, excusably or 
otherwise.  With State practice through fisheries commissions’ 
compliance committees now at least appearing to accept that quantified 
catch limits are obligations de résultat, a revived role for State 
responsibility may become a realistic possibility.  If all are accountable 
to each other thanks to their right to fish on the high seas, then the 
freedom of fishing in UNCLOS Article 116, as well as being the cause of 
the problem, paradoxically becomes part of the solution.  The creation of 
                                                                                                                                  
Dunlop, Management of the Halibut Fishery of the Northeastern Pacific Ocean and 
Bering Sea, 222, 226-27, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.10/7 (1956).   
 245. Id. at 223.  It is not clear, however, where in relation to Bmsy the stock stood at its 
nadir.   
 246. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: 
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 482 (1962). 
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a legal pecking order for access to stocks is not, by itself, where the 
matter ends.  Because it means that those States at the bottom face the 
risk of being left with nothing, a duty is thereby imposed on those higher 
up to manage the fishery in a way that maximizes the likelihood that 
something will be left over for those below.  At present, this is perhaps 
best expressed as those States at the top having to fish conservatively in 
accordance with the precautionary approach to fisheries in Annex II to 
the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement.  The paucity of State practice may 
stand in the way of a conclusion reached along classical lines that this 
has entered the corpus of custom, but the ultimate practical effect may be 
the same where, as here, an identical conclusion can be derived from the 
duty of cooperation (whose customary status is not doubted). 
V. FINAL WORD: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND A THEORY OF 
EVERYTHING? 
If the success of fisheries commissions is gauged by the health of the 
stock(s) under their management, the CCSBT and its members cannot be 
said to have succeeded in overcoming the problems of the past.  
Indonesia’s eventual accession to the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, if it 
occurs, will help in the CCSBT, but more than anything else, what is 
required is to create real, dissuasive consequences for those who do not 
comply with conservation obligations, in the form of the delinquent 
State’s secondary obligation to restore the stock to the position it would 
have been in had that State originally complied.  The dispute settlement 
provisions of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement make an approach based 
on revival of State responsibility more realistic, whether or not an 
aggrieved State actually resorts to them. 
Indeed, increased attention to State responsibility has other potential 
benefits for the management of international fisheries.247  It makes 
                                                          
 247. The variety of possible uses for invocation of State responsibility is considerable.  
With a modicum of imagination, the CCSBT could have used such a strategy as a way 
out of the 2002 impasse caused by Japan’s insistence that there were 1000 tonnes of spare 
quota—its trade statistics suggested that Indonesia’s catch was around this much less than 
the figures used by the scientists—of which 500 tonnes should be redistributed to existing 
members and the rest retained for stock recovery.  CCSBT8 Report, supra note 66, 
Attachment N-2.  Instead of resisting Japan’s call, Australia and New Zealand could have 
invited Japan to assume international responsibility for Indonesia’s catch as well as its 
own, and on that basis could have consented to a combined quota for Japan and Indonesia 
of around 7000 tonnes.  True, Japan would have been wise to decline such an offer, given 
that its confidence was soon proven misplaced, CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra note 87, 
Attachment 4.  Yet this could only have come at the cost of being seen to lack the 
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accounting properly for catch all the more crucial.  There are two issues 
here: defining and adhering to catch limits.  As to the former, irrespective 
of whether quota trading hereafter becomes a reality in the CCSBT and 
other fishery commissions, it is clear that when such bodies set TACs, in 
order to guarantee that “total” means just that, they must ensure that it is 
clear whether their quota allocations cover only commercial catch or all 
sources of catch: bycatch, scientific research catch, and recreational 
catch.  On the latter, the disastrous effect of misreporting catch not only 
for the fishery but also for the science that supports it was made clear in 
2006 when, just as the CCSBT’s painstakingly developed management 
procedure was about to be implemented, the Japanese catch figures on 
which it was partly based were exposed as grossly understated.  The 
Chair of the Scientific Committee advised that implementation could not 
proceed, as the revelations had raised major uncertainties about the 
operating model, such as how much additional fishing effort had been 
expended to make the newly admitted catch.248  Resolving these 
questions is likely to take several years,249 with substantial investment by 
the CCSBT—efforts put in by the working group convened for this 
purpose from 2000 through a series of resource-intensive workshops, the 
engagement of a number of outside consultants as an Advisory Panel, 
culminating in a Special Meeting of the Commission,250 and the choice of 
a management procedure from among the ones offered by the Scientific 
Committee251—in the interim set at naught.  
Because past understatement of catches and profits will serve to 
diminish the compensation available, raising the profile of State 
responsibility in fisheries should become a factor dissuading States from 
concealing the full extent of their fishing activity.  Concern to limit 
potential compensation could also be a far-reaching way to integrate the 
                                                                                                                                  
courage of its convictions.  Had it accepted, the responsibility for remedying the 
combined overcatch would have fallen entirely on Japan.  
 248. See e.g. CCSBT, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, at 
¶¶ 43-57 (2006), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ 
ccsbt_13/report_of_SAG7.pdf. 
 249. The timeframe for adoption, even of an interim management procedure, would be 
three to five years.  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra note 99, at 8, ¶ 46. 
 250. See CCSBT, Report of the First Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop 
(March 3-4 and 6-8, 2002), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_9/ 
report_of_mpws1.pdf; CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra note 200; CCSBT, Report of the Third 
Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop (2004), available at http://www.ccsbt.org/ 
docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_11/Report_of_mpws3.pdf; CCSBT-MPW4 Report, supra note 
199; CCSBTSM4 Report, supra note 231, app. 3. 
 251. CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra note 66, at 8, ¶ 51. 
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work on disciplines on fishery subsidies in the World Trade 
Organization’s Doha Round252 into the broader international fisheries law 
framework.  Because compensation at the international level is payable 
to States and not to the individual vessels or persons of their nationality 
who have suffered the loss, a State faced with a claim for compensation 
would naturally be inclined to insist as to quantum that the gross losses 
of those individuals be discounted for any subsidies, which do not 
represent a loss to the subsidizing State. 
Considerations of this kind suggest that States ought not to be able to 
limit their liability even inter se by according themselves high quotas in 
commissions.  To the extent that a quota binds other members of the 
commission, quotas that are part of a TAC that is in biological terms too 
high leave members with no legal recourse against States that fish within 
those quotas, and limit the compensation payable if the quotas are 
exceeded.  Here, too, the role of outsiders is crucial, as collectively the 
members have chosen to bear the risks associated with a dangerously 
high TAC, but will remain collectively responsible to them, if not to each 
other, even without any member exceeding its catch limit.  Accordingly, 
it should be provided that quota decisions are not to be taken as a 
voluntary assumption of risk by those members objecting to it as too high 
and not subsequently exceeding their own quotas under it, or those 
voting against it for this reason where there is no objection procedure.  In 
this way, the revival of State responsibility will give States an incentive 
to move away from lowest common denominator decision-making 
procedures and promote efficacious alternatives in the fisheries 
commissions of which they are members. 
If the aim is to overcome the tragedy of the commons besetting high 
seas fisheries, it is hard to disagree with the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s advocacy of indirect enforcement by 
holding flag States accountable for the actions of their vessels and 
nationals, with quota or trade sanctions for non-compliance253—in other 
                                                          
 252. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).  In the WSSD Plan of Implementation, 
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The Management of High Seas Fisheries, 8 MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS 313, 325-26 
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words, to reinstate State responsibility into international fisheries law.  
Should quota trading become more widely practiced, this would require 
that the effect of purchasing quota should be that the transferee 
member’s responsibility for reporting and compliance should be the 
same as if it had originally been allocated the entire amount by the 
commission.  Considering the potential complexity of any accounting 
mechanisms,254 it would also be sensible to have some subsidiary means 
for enforcement of quotas.  For example, members of the now defunct 
International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission were permitted to refuse 
landings of quota species from vessels flagged to States whose quota was 
exhausted.255 
Clearly, the matters set out in these last pages require a great deal 
more elaboration on the part of interested States and scholars in the years 
ahead (including building on the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility) before they can take their place in the developing 
international fisheries law landscape.  For such an all-embracing “theory 
of everything” to emerge, however, it should be apparent that the role of 
new entrants — as potential participants in a high seas fishery for a stock 
like SBT keen to ensure that their rights are not infringed, by quota 
trading or otherwise — will approach in importance that of the actual 
participants to date as they attempt to capture the benefits of the fishery 
for themselves. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
restored; because of its objection procedure, this description is not met by NAFO (and 
presumably every other fisheries commission with a similar procedure)). 
 254. Despite addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division being the only 
mathematical operations used, the opacity of the tables in ICCAT reports make it difficult 
to see how catch limits worked out in this way are derived.  See, e.g., ICCAT Green Book 
2006/1, supra note 51, at 220-29.  The problems that might arise under an excessively 
complicated accounting system are illustrated by Canada’s erroneous interpretation of an 
earlier measure. ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra note 182, Annex 5-2, at 70 (taking 
paragraph 3(c) to mean that Canada could carry over only 10% rather than all of its 
unused dead discard quota; the  reference to 10% was in fact Canada’s share of the TAC).  
Canada did not subsequently reclaim the inadvertently forgone 90%.  In a later “National 
Report of Canada,” there are useful worked examples in prose of how overage and 
unused discard quotas carried forward to subsequent years in ABT and swordfish work.  
ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra note 188, at 11. 
 255. Geen et al., supra note 181, at 154.  This Commission ceased to exist at the 
beginning of 2007 after all its members but the Russian Federation joined the latter.  See 
European Commission, About the Common Fisheries Policy, The International Baltic Sea 
Fisheries Commission (IBSFC), http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_relations/rfos/ 
ibsfc_en.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).  
